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THE RAPID TRANSFORMATION of Chinese politics and the 
Chinese economy seems unending. This year brought Xinjiang into 
mainstream discussions about terrorism, debates over rule of law 
returned with the fourth plenum, and the anti-corruption campaign 
picked up steam. But just as important are the ongoing reforms and 
policy concerns that continue to evolve over years and decades. One 
of these concerns is environmental protection.
 This inaugural issue of China Studies Review is dedicated to 
environmental regulation and politics. Tremayne Gibson examines 
WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI %HLMLQJ¶V QXFOHDU SROLF\ DQG ¿QGV WKDW WKH
EHQH¿WVRIQXFOHDUSRZHUDUHPDUULHGWRDZHDNUHJXODWRU\VWUXFWXUH
the vulnerability of inland nuclear plans to natural disasters, and 
inadequate policy coordination, which cloud the future of nuclear 
energy in China. Bo Li looks at the role of the cadre evaluation 
system in environmental management. Applying studies in Chinese 
EXUHDXFUDF\/LLQYHVWLJDWHVWKHLQÀXHQFHVRIWRSGRZQDVVLJQPHQWV
and bottom-up local autonomy on the effectiveness of environmen-
WDOSROLFLHV$QG¿QDOO\,ODULD0R]]RFFRFRPSDUHVHPLVVLRQWUDGLQJ
systems in China and the European Union, identifying lessons for 
related laws and policies moving forward. She highlights a lack of 
central planning as the foremost challenge to the long-term success 
of cap and trade programs.
 We at the China Studies department are excited to launch 
China Studies Review as a platform for graduate students to increase 
our understanding of China, its domestic challenges and opportuni-
ties, and its role in the international order.
      Kendrick Kuo
      Washington, DC
LETTER FROM THE EDITOR
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FOREWORD
FOR NEARLY FOUR DECADES China has experienced 
continuously dramatic transformation. Throughout this period, the 
China Studies program of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies (SAIS) has been a leading center for research 
and teaching on contemporary China. Training professionals with 
the historically grounded understanding of contemporary Chinese 
SROLWLFVDQGHFRQRP\QHHGHGWRFRQ¿GHQWO\DQGDFFXUDWHO\LQWHUSUHW
China’s changing domestic and international policies and their 
outcomes has been a core mission of the program since it was 
established.
 ,Q WKH HDUO\ V WKH SURJUDP¶V ¿UVW GLUHFWRU$ 'RDN
Barnett, launched a China program that would give students from 
all over the world, including the United States and China, insights 
into Chinese politics, economy, and society that would help mitigate 
a repeat of the destructive estrangement between China and the 
:HVWRIWKH&ROG:DU%DUQHWWZDVDSUROL¿FZULWHURQ&KLQDZKRVH
PRUH WKDQ WZHQW\ERRNV LQFOXGHG¿UVWKDQGDFFRXQWVRI&KLQD LQ
the ferment of revolution and the challenges it faced in making the 
transition to reforming its economy. Barnett’s successor, David M. 
Lampton, a path-breaking scholar of China’s foreign and domestic 
policy and the former president of the National Committee on 
US-China Relations, has built on Barnett’s foundation to develop 
a China program that enables students to make sense of the 
ever-accelerating evolution of China’s foreign and domestic policy. 
Today, the SAIS China Studies program routinely offers 14 to 15 
courses on contemporary China. In addition, growing numbers of 
SAIS students are spending a year in China at the Hopkins-Nanjing 
Center for Chinese and American Studies, established by John 




economically interdependent but also more at odds on international 
LVVXHVWKDQDWDQ\RWKHUWLPHVLQFHQRUPDOL]DWLRQEHLQJDEOHWRH[SODLQ
China’s international domestic and foreign policy preferences has 
potentially profound implications for sustained global economic 
growth and international peace and security. China Studies Review 
showcases some of the research and analysis produced by the 
talented graduate students immersed in China Studies at SAIS and 
guest contributors from other graduate programs.
 I am a graduate of SAIS China Studies, a former Ph.D. 
student of A. Doak Barnett, who has had the honor and excitement 
of teaching and doing research at SAIS for much of my career. The 
launch of China Studies Review with its commitment to graduate 
student research on Chinese politics, history, and economics is 
overdue. In the spirit of SAIS, the articles in the China Studies 
Review merge academic rigor and policy relevance to provide 








Boon or Bane for China’s 
Environment?
7UHPD\QH*LEVRQ1
The world’s largest expansion in recent memory of a civilian nuclear industry 
LVFXUUHQWO\XQGHUZD\LQ&KLQD2I¿FLDOODQJXDJHIURP&KLQHVHOHDGHUVDW
all levels of government suggest concerns about the environment, which 
may be an important factor motivating the government to invest heavily in 
the nuclear sector. While an expanded share for nuclear power in China’s 
HQHUJ\PL[FRXOGGHOLYHUHQRUPRXVEHQH¿WVIRU&KLQD¶VDLUTXDOLW\HIIRUWV
WR¿JKWJOREDOFOLPDWHFKDQJHDQGHYHQLWVZDWHUVKRUWDJHVWKHGRZQVLGHV
of nuclear power expansion may have a net negative effect for China’s 
environment. Poor energy and environmental policy coordination, height-
HQHGULVNVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKLQODQGQXFOHDUSODQWVLQDUHDVZLWKIUHTXHQWHG
QDWXUDO GLVDVWHUV DQG DQ RYHUEXUGHQHG DQG LQDGHTXDWH UHJXODWRU\
structure are getting in the way of a successful roll-out of China’s nuclear 
expansion, not to mention ulterior motivations driving Chinese leaders. 
CHINA IS IN THE MIDST OF A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE the 
likes of which the world has not seen since the heyday of nuclear 
power plant construction in the United States in the 1960s and 70s. 
:KLOHWKHH[DFW¿JXUHVUHPDLQLQÀX[LQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDOVWXGLHV
project China building as many as 200 to 300 reactors by mid-
century to satisfy its growing demand for power.2  This expansion 
comes amid a struggle within Chinese society between satisfying 
17UHPD\QH*LEVRQLVDQ$VVRFLDWHDWWKH:DVKLQJWRQ'&RI¿FHRI*OREDO5LVN$GYL-
sors. He is a SAIS China Studies alumnus, and a graduate of Harvard College. His areas 
of professional and academic interests include China’s foreign relations and domestic 
politics as well as general developments in East Asia. In addition to his studies, he 
has lived and worked in China and has traveled throughout the county and the region 
extensively.
2 Ariana Eunjung Cha, “China Embraces Nuclear Future,” The Washington Post, May 





the needs for economic development and increasing environmental 
protection. 
 7KHUH ZLOO FOHDUO\ EH EHQH¿WV IURP QXFOHDU SRZHU IRU
economic development, including the provision of massive sources 
of reliable energy near population centers, but China’s rapid 
expansion of its civilian industry will also yield unintended negative 
effects, despite the intended goals outlined by senior policymakers 
in the Chinese government. An expansion of the civilian nuclear 
industry is unlikely to yield positive gains for the environment under 
FXUUHQW FRQGLWLRQV JLYHQ WKH YDULRXV GH¿FLHQFLHV ZLWKLQ &KLQD¶V
environmental protection strategies, the sheer scale of some of its 
environmental challenges, questionable regulatory structure, and 
strong competing motivations distracting attention away from safety 
or environmental priorities. 
Nuclear Development in China: A Brief Overview 
China’s civilian nuclear industry did not really take off until the 
early 1970s when Premier Zhou Enlai, responding to a report on 
Shanghai’s electricity shortage, made the observation that “from a 
long-term point of view, nuclear power is the only solution for the 
shortage of electricity in Shanghai and East China.”3  Zhou ordered 
the planning of the 728 Project or what would later become the 
4LQVKDQQXFOHDUSRZHUSODQW&KLQD¶V¿UVWFLYLOLDQQXFOHDUUHDFWRU
Upon the plant’s opening in 1991, Deng Xiaoping gave his blessing 
to the endeavor by referring to the facility as the “glory of the 
nation.”4 Under the stewardship of President Jiang Zemin, China 
began construction on its next ten reactors, most of which began 
operating in the early 2000s.
 The expansion of China’s civilian nuclear industry has 
FDUHIXOO\IROORZHGRI¿FLDOSROLF\ODQJXDJH8QGHUPRVWRI-LDQJ¶V
tenure the Chinese government endorsed the idea of “small batch 
3 Jianping Cai, “Progress of China’s Nuclear Power Programme,” (Proceedings of a 
technical committee meeting on advances in heavy water reactor technology, Mumbai, 
India, January 29-February 1, 1996), accessed July 11, 2014, http://www.iaea.org/inis/
collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/29/024/29024315.pdf.
4 James L. Tyson, “China Turns On to Nuclear Power,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, March 25, 1992, accessed on July 16, 2014, http://www.csmonitor.
com/1992/0325/25121.html.
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development” of nuclear power, later adopting the language of 
“appropriate development” during the Fifth Plenary Session of the 
Fifteenth Party Congress in 2000.5 Under President Hu Jintao, the 
Chinese government adopted more stimulating language. In March 
2005, Premier Wen Jiabao issued directives to adjust China’s energy 
mix and vigorously develop nuclear power.6 The eleventh Five Year 
Plan (2006-2010) adopted these directives as policy when it called 
for the “active development” of nuclear power. Since then twenty-
eight reactors have been built and nearly 206 other projects have 
been proposed, approved or begun construction.7  
 In 2007, the National Development and Reform Commission 
1'5&UHOHDVHGWKHRI¿FLDOJRYHUQPHQWSRVLWLRQRQQXFOHDUSRZHU
that called for China to increase its total installed nuclear capacity 
from nine to forty gigawatts (GW) by 2020, roughly increasing 
nuclear power’s share of China’s total energy consumption from 2 
percent to 4 percent.87KLV WDUJHWIRUÀXFWXDWHGRYHU WLPHDV
the pace of new plant proposals outstripped original expectations. 
By 2008, the government had revised the target upward to sixty GW 
and 5 percent of the energy mix. In 2009, the number was again 
revised to seventy GW, with some within the State Council even 
suggesting pushing the target further to 86 GW.9 The Fukushima 
disaster in 2011 led to a temporary halt to all construction and project 
approvals of nuclear plants and led to a decreased target of 58 GW.10 
5 “໨׏ݚ৶نᅡ୔"׏މᗓఖ”ifeng.com, September 24, 2009, accessed July 11, 2014, 
KWWS¿QDQFHLIHQJFRPQHZVLQGXVWU\VKWPO
6 Zhongxiang Zhang, “China in the transition to a low-carbon economy,” Energy Policy 
38 (2010): 6647, accessed July 11, 2014, doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2010.06.034.
7 “Nuclear Power in China,” World Nuclear AssociationODVWPRGL¿HG-XO\KWWS
ZZZZRUOGQXFOHDURUJLQIR&RXQWU\3UR¿OHV&RXQWULHV$)&KLQD1XFOHDU3RZ-
er/. 
8 China National Development and Reform Commission, ׏މᇖӐఀنᅡ݆ߊ
୔) (Beijing: October 2007), 8-9, accessed July 11, 2014, http://www.etiea.cn/data/
attachment/123(4).pdf.
9 Ryan Ong, “A Boost for Nuclear Power,” China Business Review, May 1, 2010, 
accessed July 11, 2014, http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/a-boost-for-nuclear-
power/; Keith Bradsher, “Nuclear Power Expansion in China Stirs Concerns,” The 
New York Times, December 16, 2009, accessed July 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/12/16/business/global/16chinanuke.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
10 Zhidong Li, “China’s Efforts for Keeping the Safety of Nuclear Power Compatible 
ZLWK(FRQRPLF(I¿FLHQF\´The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, September 2013, 
accessed on July 11, 2014, https://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/5126.pdf.
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(YHQXQGHUWKLVODWHVW¿JXUH&KLQDEHWZHHQDQGLVVHW
to construct nearly 40 percent of the global net increase in nuclear 
capacity.11  
Going Nuclear to Go Green?
Environmental concerns motivate China’s embrace of nuclear 
power and plans for its large-scale development. The policy pivot to 
“active development” of nuclear power came at a time when Chinese 
leaders confronted the downsides of unbridled economic growth. A 
\HDUDIWHUWDNLQJRI¿FH3UHVLGHQW+X-LQWDRLQWURGXFHGZKDWZRXOG
EHFRPH KLV DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V JXLGLQJ SKLORVRSK\²WKH ³6FLHQWL¿F
Outlook on Development”—which at its core was an answer to 
the host of problems brought about by the previous decade’s rapid 
economic growth, among them: regional developmental imbalances, 
growing wealth disparities, environmental degradation, and soaring 
HQHUJ\GHPDQG'XULQJ D  WULS WR -LDQJ[L+XGH¿QHG VFLHQ-
WL¿FGHYHORSPHQWDV³FRRUGLQDWHGGHYHORSPHQWDOODURXQGGHYHORS-
ment, and sustainable development,” the kind that “combines the 
development of the economy with the protection of resources and 
the environment.”12 Later that year, on a trip to Hunan, Hu further 
GHVFULEHGVFLHQWL¿FGHYHORSPHQWDV³IDVWHUDQGEHWWHUHFRQRPLFDQG
social development.”13  
 Hu made it his mission to jumpstart China’s economic tran-
sition to sustainable growth in which long-term economic interests 
and other social concerns play a decisive role in decision-making 
about development. This transition required altering the country’s 
energy policies. By the early 2000s, China’s double-digit economic 
growth placed the country on an unsustainable trajectory. There is a 
nearly one-for-one relationship between Chinese GDP growth and 
net increases in electricity consumption between 1990 and 2010 
11 “China set to build 200 nuclear power plants: report,” LiveMint, Sep-








(Figure 1). Chinese growth also correlates with the sudden takeoff 
of Chinese carbon dioxide emissions beginning in 2000 (Figure 2), 
continuing on an upward trajectory from 3 billion to 9 billion tons 
of emissions released annually. China overtook the United States in 
2007 to become the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide.
 Underlying both sets of data is another trend of steadily 
increasing consumption of coal. Coal is China’s primary energy 
source, accounting for more than 80 percent of its electricity gen-
eration in 2007, and today still dominates over two-thirds of the 
country’s energy mix. China’s coal consumption jumped from 
just under 1.5 billion metric tons in 2002 to nearly 2.9 billion by 
2008.14 Alongside this increase in coal use was a steady rise in sulfur 
dioxide emissions, which rose 27 percent between 2000 and 2005 
to over 25 million tons annually.15 A natural byproduct of this triad 
of rapid development, soaring energy demand, and rising emissions 
was rapidly deteriorating air quality. 
,WFRPHVDVQRVXUSULVH WKHQWKDWRI¿FLDO WDONDERXW WKHH[SDQVLRQ
of civilian nuclear power in China is littered with language linking 
WKHH[SDQVLRQWRHQYLURQPHQWDOFRQFHUQV3URGXFLQJYLUWXDOO\]HUR
carbon emissions, nuclear power is in the eyes of many Chinese pol-
icymakers an excellent resource to simultaneously satisfy national 
energy needs and also curb pollution. Such logic is featured most 
SURPLQHQWO\LQWKH1'5&UHSRUWRXWOLQLQJWKHRI¿FLDOJRYHUQ-
ment line on nuclear power. In the report, the powerful economic 
planning commission lists environmental protection as an important 
advantage of nuclear power development. It describes the country’s 
increasing reliance on coal for energy generation as a burden and 
nuclear power as a “clean energy” (TLQJMLHQHQJ\XDQ) that is “an 
effective way to reduce emissions of pollutants, but also an important 
measure to mitigate global warming.”16
 Adding weight to this thinking was President Hu himself, 
who in a 2009 address before the United Nations General Assembly 
SOHGJHG WR ¿JKW FOLPDWH FKDQJH E\ WDNLQJ IRUFHIXO PHDVXUHV WR
14 Yun Zhou, “Why is China going nuclear?,” Energy Policy 38 (2010): 3755, accessed 
July 15, 2014, doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2010.02.053.
15 “China’s Sulfur Dioxide Discharge Tops World List,” Xinhua, August 3, 2006, ac-
cessed July 15, 2014, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Aug/176872.htm.
16 China National Development and Reform Commission, 8-9.
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“vigorously develop renewable energy and nuclear energy” and “to 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “International Energy Statistics” and The World 
Bank, “Date: GDP (constant 2005 US$)”. 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “International Energy Statistics”.
 increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption 
to around 15 percent by 2020.”17 Hu reinforced his message a year 
ODWHUZKLOH LQVSHFWLQJ WKH'D\D%D\ QXFOHDU IDFLOLW\ LQ 6KHQ]KHQ
17 “Hu Jintao’s Speech on Climate Change,” The New York Times, September 22, 2009, 





country’s energy structure and cut greenhouse gas emissions.”18  
 3URIHVVRU*X=KRQJPDR DQ RI¿FLDO DW WKH&KLQD ,QVWLWXWH
of Atomic Energy, was quoted in 2007 as saying China’s “irratio-
nal energy structure is causing serious pollution and greenhouse 
problems,” a thought he later followed up on in 2014 by saying that 
“[t]o completely get rid of smog, nuclear power is the only option. 
If we build as many nuclear power stations as there are in France 
and Japan, we will also enjoy blue skies and clean air like they 
do.”19 Professor Li Zhong, who is involved in a Chinese Academy 
of Sciences research project to design a new thorium-fueled nuclear 
reactor, also spoke candidly about the links between China’s nuclear 
and environmental policies. Earlier this year he was quoted as 
saying:
 
In the past, the government was interested in nuclear power 
because of the energy shortage. Now, they are more inter-
ested because of smog . . . . The problem of coal has become 
clear, if the average energy consumption per person doubles, 
this country will be choked to death by polluted air. Nuclear 
power provides the only solution for massive coal replace-
ment and thorium carries much hope.20 
The idea of nuclear energy potentially reducing the country’s 
dependence on coal was shared by Zhang Guobao, former chief 
of the National Energy Administration and vice-director of the 
Subcommittee of Economy under the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee. In a China 
Daily report he explained that China’s “strategy of accelerating the 
18³3UHVLGHQW+XFDOOVIRUPRUHLQQRYDWLRQXVHRIFOHDQHQHUJ\GXULQJ6KHQ]KHQWRXU´
Xinhua, September 7, 2010, accessed July 16, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng-
lish2010/china/2010-09/07/c_13482588.htm. 
19 Cha; Stephen Chen, “Chinese scientists urged to develop new thorium nuclear reac-
tors by 2024,” South China Morning Post, March 18, 2014, accessed July 15, 2014, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1452011/chinese-scientists-urged-develop-
new-thorium-nuclear-reactors-2024?page=all.
20 Jennifer Duggan, “China working on uranium-free nuclear plants in attempt to combat 
smog,” The Guardian, March 19, 2014, accessed on July 15, 2014, http://www.the-
guardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/china-uranium-nuclear-plants-smog-thorium; Chen.
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development of [nuclear] technology” was a part of “efforts to reduce 
China’s reliance on coal.”21=KDQJ+XD]KXIRUPHUGLUHFWRURIWKH
China Atomic Energy Authority and member of the CPPCC National 
Committee, couched the link between environmental protection and 
nuclear expansion as a natural extension of the leadership’s guiding 
SKLORVRSK\RIVFLHQWL¿FGHYHORSPHQW6SHDNLQJEHIRUHDQDVVHPEO\
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Paris in 
2005, Zhang described the government’s decision to “to positively 
promote the development of nuclear power” as a “requirement of 
the harmonious development of economy, society and ecological 
environment and the demand of sustainable development.”22 
Beyond the Dream: Practical Impacts of Nuclear 
Power
Environmental concerns are, at least in part, motivating the push by 
Chinese policymakers at all levels for an expansion of the civilian 
nuclear industry. Given public statements by Chinese leaders, it is 
clear that at the heart of this concern is a desire to improve China’s 
air quality by reducing the nation’s consumption of coal. While 
nuclear power has the potential to greatly reduce air pollution, poor 
coordination between China’s environmental and energy policies is 
LQKLELWLQJWKHUHDOL]DWLRQRIWKDWSRWHQWLDO
 Given the technology being developed and plans for vast 
numbers of nuclear facilities in inland areas, the future impact 
of nuclear power on China’s water systems should be an equally 
important environmental consideration. The immensity of the 
water challenges facing China precludes the possibility of nuclear 
power providing any substantial environmental gains in this regard. 
Moreover, nuclear power plants in China’s inland provinces may 
threaten China’s fragile water supplies, given the dangers inherent 
21 Wu Jiao, “Govt eyes nuclear energy as oil price rises,” China Daily, March 11, 2011, 
accessed July 15, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011npc/2011-03/11/con-
tent_12152749.htm.
22+XD]KX=KDQJ³1XFOHDU(QHUJ\'HYHORSPHQWLQ&KLQD)URPWKH3URVSHFWLYH
of National Energy Strategy” (address to the Conference on Nuclear Power for the 
21st Century in Paris, France, March 21, 2005), accessed July 15, 2014, http://www.
chinesemission-vienna.at/eng/hplyhnyfks/t210152.htm.
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mid-level policymakers, it seems that China expects its nuclear 
strategy to yield positive dividends for its environment, primarily 
through improved air quality from reduced coal consumption and 
lower greenhouse gas emissions. To that end there are various 
projects computing actual measurements of how these goals are 
being achieved. A 2009 report by Cong Weike of China National 
Nuclear Corporation’s Geology Bureau equated the 68.4 terawatt-
hours of electricity generated from nuclear facilities in 2008 with a 
reduction of over 80 million tons of carbon dioxide and 400,000 tons 
of sulfur dioxide. The report went on to describe China’s original 
plans to construct forty GW of installed nuclear capacity by 2020 as 
leading to a 296 million ton reduction in carbon dioxide emissions 
and a 1 million ton drop in sulfur dioxide emissions per year.23 A 
similar report by Professor Chen Shaofeng of Peking University’s 
School of International Studies attributed a saving of 25 million 
tons of coal and a reduction of 73 million tons of carbon dioxide 
emissions each year to the operation of thirteen reactors, which in 
2010 generated about 2 percent of national electricity.24  
 It remains unclear exactly how building more nuclear power 
plants is supposed to impact China’s air quality. Are policymakers 
expecting nuclear power to be the only new source of power added 
in the future, thus obviating the need for any future coal plants? Or 
are they planning to replace existing coal plants with new nuclear 
facilities as they come online? If the former, then all China’s nuclear 
VWUDWHJ\PD\OHDGWRLVDIUHH]HLQWKHFXUUHQWDE\VPDOHQYLURQPHQWDO
23 Weike Cong, “Nuclear Industry in China” (presentation by China National Nuclear 
Corporation to IAEA in 2009), accessed July 21, 2014, http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/
meetings/PDFplus/2009/cn175/URAM2009/Session%201/8_33_Cong_China.pdf.
24 Shaofeng Chen, “Impact of Fukushima Accident on China’s Nuclear Energy Develop-
ment” (Keynote speech in Workshop “What Fukushima nuclear disaster brought about 
in Asia?,” Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyo Policy Alterna-
tives Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan, February 13, 2013), accessed July 15, 2014, 
http://pari.u-tokyo.ac.jp/eng/event/smp130213_info.html.
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situation. If the latter, then China’s nuclear strategy may improve 
its air quality, but will not be able to keep up with growing power 
demand in the future. Only by adopting a combined strategy will 
China be able to both reduce its coal consumption and meet its 
energy needs and environmental goals. New nuclear facilities must 
be built with capacities large enough, and at a pace fast enough, to 
not only replace existing coal plants but to also lessen the need to 
build new coal plants. In this way coal’s share in China’s energy 
mix may gradually be reduced giving way for increasingly larger 
contributions from nuclear power.
 Evidence suggests that none of the above strategies are being 
implemented. As of 2012, China has plans to construct 363 new coal 
plants across the country totaling 557 GW in capacity, a 75 percent 
LQFUHDVHRQ LWV FRDO¿UHGJHQHUDWLQJFDSDFLW\25 While Beijing has 
numerous goals to shutdown small scale coal plants and those near 
WKH³NH\WKUHHFLW\FOXVWHUV´RI%HLMLQJ6KDQJKDLDQG*XDQJ]KRX
the reality is these facilities are merely being replaced by larger 
plants in the country’s interior provinces.26 Nuclear power is thus 
not preventing new coal facilities from coming online. 
 New nuclear plants are also not necessarily replacing existing 
coal plants. One could logically deduce that an intention to boost the 
share of non-fossil fuels and reduce the share of coal in the national 
energy mix would mean simply replacing one with the other. The 
most promising clean energy sources are wind and nuclear power, 
due to stagnant growth in the solar industry and a reluctance to 
further pursue hydropower on a large scale. One would therefore 
expect to see the share of wind and nuclear power in China’s energy 
mix rise as that of coal fell. China, however, has engaged in a sleight 
of hand in which many of the coal plants it has “shuttered” have 
VLPSO\EHHQFRQYHUWHGLQWRJDV¿UHGSODQWV,I&KLQDKDGDEXQGDQW
supplies of natural gas this would be an improvement (natural gas is 
25 Tianyi Luo, Betsy Otto, and Andrew Maddocks, “Majority of China’s Proposed 
Coal-Fired Power Plants Located in Water-Stressed Regions,” World Resources 
Institute, August 26, 2013, accessed July 15, 2014, http://www.wri.org/blog/majority-
FKLQD(VSURSRVHGFRDO¿UHGSRZHUSODQWVORFDWHGZDWHUVWUHVVHGUHJLRQV
26 Ailun Yang, “Can China’s Air Pollution Action Plan Slow Down New Coal Power 




a far cleaner source of energy than coal), but China is a net importer 
of natural gas and has increasingly relied upon the conversion of 
coal into synthetic gas to meet its energy needs. The government’s 
plan to reduce the share of coal in the country’s energy mix to below 
65 percent by 2017 is thus a misleading policy.27 
 The process of converting coal into synthetic gas is actually 
far dirtier than burning the coal itself, producing 36 to 82 percent 
more greenhouse gas emissions when the entire process is taken into 
account. The process is also incredibly water-intensive, requiring 
¿IW\WRRQHKXQGUHGWLPHVPRUHZDWHUWKDQLWZRXOGWDNHWRH[WUDFW
DQHTXLYDOHQW FXELFPHWHURI VKDOHJDV<HWGR]HQVRI FRQYHUVLRQ
facilities are being planned across the country.28 Ambitious targets 
have the country on course to produce 15 to 18 billion cubic meters 
RI V\QJDV DQQXDOO\ E\  XS IURP YLUWXDOO\ ]HUR FDSDFLW\ LQ
2013. Nearly half of Beijing’s gas demand will be met in 2017 by a 
massive industrial complex in Inner Mongolia.29 
 For this and other reasons, including the fact that China’s 
continued growth will fuel continued increases in energy demand, 
experts like Jonathan Sinton, a China specialist at the International 
Energy Agency in Paris, believe that even if China meets its targets 
for nuclear expansion, total emissions will still rise 72 to 88 percent 
by 2020.30 
:DWHU6FDUFLW\:LOO3HUVLVW
Though not widely discussed, a massive expansion in nuclear 
power plants could also open up huge sources of desperately needed 
potable water in some of China’s most water scarce regions. China’s 
struggles with water shortages are well known. A nation with 20 
27 China Ministry of Environmental Protection, The State Council Issues Action Plan 
on Prevention and Control of Air Pollution Introducing Ten Measures to Improve Air 
Quality (Beijing: September 12, 2013), accessed July 15, 2014, http://english.mep.gov.
cn/News_service/infocus/201309/t20130924_260707.htm.
28 Chi-Jen Yang and Robert B. Jackson, “China’s synthetic natural gas revolution,” 
Nature Climate Change 3 (2013): 852-854, accessed July 15, 2014, http://people.duke.
edu/~cy42/SNG.pdf.





percent of the world’s population, China holds only 7 percent of 
its fresh water resources. Heavy use of those limited resources has 
caused over 27,000 rivers to dry up since the 1950s. Beijing in par-
ticular faces an acute water shortage, having only 235 cubic meters 
RIZDWHUSHUFDSLWD7KH8QLWHG1DWLRQVUHFRJQL]HVDQ\WKLQJEHORZ
1,000 cubic meters as a water shortage.31 
 Nuclear power plants offer a partial solution to this problem 
through desalination technology. The desalination process, normally 
powered by fossil fuels, can be driven by the intense heat released 
by the nuclear reactor and done on a scale that makes the desalinated 
water far cheaper than water diverted from distant regions via canals. 
For example, water from nuclear desalination could be produced 
for as little as $0.12 per ton versus the expected cost of $2.41 per 
ton water from the North South Water Diversion Project.32 The gov-
ernment has already announced plans to produce 2.2 million cubic 
meters of desalinated water per day by 2015 through the regular 
fossil fuel-driven process.33 If this drive to boost the output of de-
salinated water is paired with China’s planned expansion of nuclear 
power plants, millions of tons of potable water could be produced 
each year.
 There are obvious limitations, however, to nuclear desalina-
WLRQZKLFKGLVTXDOL¿HVLWIURPEHLQJWKHDQVZHUWR&KLQD¶VZDWHU
problem. First, this technology has yet to be deployed on a large scale 
RULQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRRI¿FLDOSROLF\7RGDWHRQO\DKDQGIXORIIDFLOLWLHV
have been built with this capacity, including the Hongyanhe nuclear 
plant in Liaoning Province, which is now capable of producing 
nearly 10,000 cubic meters of potable water each day.34 Second, 
of the hundreds of plants being built, constructed, or proposed, the 
majority is in the water-rich south. Of the approximately 254 plants 
31 “Desperate measures,” The Economist, October 12, 2013, accessed July 15, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21587789-desperate-measures.
32 Using 2001 exchange rate of 8.2674 RMB per 1 USD. “Seawater Desalination by Us-
ing Nuclear Power,” China Education and Research Network, January 1, 2001, accessed 
July 15, 2014, http://www.edu.cn/20010101/22349.shtml.
33 “China names regions for seawater desalination,” China Daily, March 15, 2013, 
accessed July 15, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-03/15/con-
tent_16311979.htm.
34 “Commercial operation at Hongyanhe 2,” World Nuclear News, February 28, 2012, 
accessed July 15, 2014, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Commercial-operation-
at-Hongyanhe-2-2802144.html.
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in operation, under construction, or proposed, seventy-nine are in 
the four provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, 
while only twenty-seven will be located in the water scarce regions 
of Shandong, Liaoning, and Hebei.35 Third, nuclear desalination will 
offer no direct impact on the water scarce regions in China’s interior, 
and may at best result in less water being diverted away to cities like 
Beijing. Finally, China’s average annual per capita water supply is 
652 cubic meters below the U.N. threshold for water shortages.36 To 
close that gap would require nearly a trillion cubic meters of water 
to be introduced, and even if every single reactor along the coast 
ran at full capacity every day they would produce nowhere near that 
amount. So at best, if this technology is ever seriously implemented, 
it could offer only minor relief to select areas.
 Not only is nuclear technology unable to substantially 
relieve China’s water problems, but nuclear power also poses a risk 
to the quality of its already limited water supplies. The risk stems 
from potential inland nuclear plants. While coastal plants can rely 
on the oceans to cool themselves, inland plants will need to tap into 
strained rivers and lakes. Nearly 28 percent of China’s rivers and 38 
percent of China’s lakes and reservoirs contain water that is unsafe 
IRUKXPDQFRQWDFWDQGXQ¿W IRU LQGXVWULDOXVH6LWLQJ WKHVHSODQWV
in inland provinces near the remaining potable water supplies may 
stir resentment among locals.37 Under ideal conditions in which 
nothing goes wrong, nuclear plants could damage nearby river and 
lake ecologies, as heated water from the reactors is recycled back to 
its source.38 This would not only hurt the environment but also local 
HFRQRPLHVGHSHQGHQWRQLQODQG¿VKHULHV,QODQGQXFOHDUSODQWVZLOO
DOVREHLQDUHDVSURQHWRÀRRGLQJGURXJKWDQGHDUWKTXDNHV3RRU
designs in the plants or unpredictable natural events could easily 
cause a disaster exposing inland water supplies to a possible leak of 
35 “Nuclear Power in China.”
36 “Desperate measures,” The Economist, October 12, 2013, accessed July 15, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21587789-desperate-measures.
37 “2013 State of Environment Report Review,” China Water Risk, July 9, 2014, ac-
cessed on July 24, 2014,
http://chinawaterrisk.org/resources/analysis-reviews/2013-state-of-environment-report-
review/.




 The incident in 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan 
demonstrated to the world the catastrophic consequences for nuclear 
facilities that can unfold in the face of unpredictable natural disasters. 
Consequently, approvals for all inland nuclear power plants in China 
KDYHEHHQIUR]HQXQWLOE\6WDWH&RXQFLOGHFUHH3UHVVXUHIURP
lower levels of government have already surfaced calling for an early 
removal of the moratorium or at the very least a quick resumption 
of approvals and constructions in early 2015. Examples include the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which in 2014 recommended 
that China “vigorously develop nuclear energy and restart the plan 
to build nuclear power stations inland.”40 While the risks associ-
ated with these plants will remain, they will likely be mitigated by 
WKHQHZVLPSOL¿HGSDVVLYHVDIHW\V\VWHPVRI7RVKLED:HVWLQJKRXVH
AP1000 Generation III+ reactor that China purchased in 2007 and 
potentially intends to use as the design model in future projects.41 
For instance, fewer pipes and pumps and gravity-driven circulation 
for cooling would prevent another Fukushima-type disaster from 
RFFXUULQJLQ&KLQDLQWKHHYHQWWKDWDÀRRGGLVDEOHGDSODQW¶VSRZHU
There May Not Be Safety in Numbers
Any limited, environmental gains from nuclear power would be 
wiped out by a single catastrophic event wherein radioactive material 
is uncontrollably released from one of these plants. Such accidents 
occur due to unpredictable events akin to those at Fukushima, poor 
regulation and substandard operation like that at Chernobyl, or 
39 Wang Yi’nan, “Drought and earthquakes pose ‘enormous risk’ to China’s nuclear 
plans,” China Dialogue, February 27, 2013, accessed July 15, 2014, https://www.china-
dialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5746-Drought-and-earthquakes-pose-enormous-risk-
to-China-s-nuclear-plans; “Experts disagree on China’s plans for inland nuclear plants,” 
Want China Times, May 6, 2014, accessed July 15, 2014, http://www.wantchinatimes.
com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140506000061&cid=1105.
40 Wu Wencong, “Report calls for building inland nuclear power stations,” China 
Daily, June 27, 2014, accessed July 24, 2014, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/busi-
ness/2014-06/27/content_17618759.htm; Lyu Chang, “Experts: Inland nuclear projects 
should resume,” China Daily, May 15, 2014, accessed July 24, 2014, http://www.china-
GDLO\FRPFQEL]FKLQDJUHHQFKLQDFRQWHQWBKWP




structure and an inadequate pool of human capital to operate its 
H[SDQGLQJÀHHWRIQXFOHDUIDFLOLWLHVFRPELQHGZLWKWKHVKHHUVFDOH
and pace at which these facilities are being built, increases the likeli-
KRRGRIDQHYHQWVLPLODUWR&KHUQRE\O1XPHURXVRI¿FLDOVLQ&KLQD
have expressed this possibility, including He Zuoxiu, a professor 
ZKRKHOSHGGHYHORS&KLQD¶V¿UVWQXFOHDUERPE+HZDVTXRWHGDV
saying, “Are we really ready for this kind of giddy speed [of nuclear 
development]? I think not—we’re seriously underprepared, espe-
cially on the safety front.”42  
,QHɲHFWLYH5HJXODWLRQ
In the twenty-six years since breaking ground at Qinshan, Chinese 
leaders have tried and failed three times to draft and pass an Atomic 
Energy Law. Such a law would provide an overarching legal 
framework to govern all aspects of the country’s nuclear activities. 
It would establish a clear division of responsibilities among nuclear-
UHODWHG DJHQFLHV VWDQGDUGL]H FRQVWUXFWLRQ VDIHW\ DQG RSHUDWLRQDO
practices, and make provisions for dealing with nuclear accidents, 
including establishing proper liability guidelines.43 While China has 
no nuclear laws on the books (except one governing waste disposal), 
it has a litany of less legally binding provisions of varying strength 
including seven State Council regulations, thirty-six departmental 
rules, eighty-six safety guides, and 180 technical documents.44 China 
experts Bo Kong and David Lampton describe three key problems 
hampering efforts to pass a nuclear law: 1) an overworked top-level 
leadership unable to steward the process; 2) the lack of a champion 
among the mid-level bureaucracies able to forge consensus among 
WKH YDULRXV VWDNHKROGHUV DQG  LQ¿JKWLQJ EHWZHHQ FRPSHWLQJ
42 Jonathan Watts, “Wikileaks cables reveal fears over China’s nuclear safety,” The 
Guardian, August 25, 2011, accessed July 15, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/envi-
ronment/2011/aug/25/wikileaks-fears-china-nuclear-safety.
43 Bo Kong and David Lampton, “Whither the Atomic Energy Law in China?,” GEEI 
China Nuclear Series 6, (February 2012), 1-8.
44 Yang Bo, “China Nuclear Energy Development,” China Nuclear Energy Association, 





 In part a result of this failure to legislate China’s nuclear regu-
latory structure is a fragmented mess with multiple agencies sharing 
responsibility to police the nuclear industry. For example, while the 
National Energy Administration (NEA) governs the development, 
planning, and approval of nuclear projects, the National Nuclear 
Safety Administration (NNSA) oversees plant licensing, siting, and 
also governs safety. Although the NNSA’s jurisdiction for policing 
safety only extends throughout the interior of power plants, the 
China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) handles trouble occurring 
outside the plants. Despite their role in regulating the nuclear sector, 
neither the NNSA nor NEA are permitted to interact with the in-
ternational community or the IAEA with respect to nonprolifera-
tion issues—that job is reserved for the CAEA. At any given time, 
these agencies also have to interact with other ministries with stakes 
in the nuclear industry, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Science 
and Technology, and State Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission. The lack of a clear division of labor has led to much 
confusion among these agencies in their everyday work, and es-
pecially in their interactions with outside parties. Internal debates 
DPRQJQXFOHDURI¿FLDOVIURPWKH&$($DQG1($RYHUZKLFKDJHQF\
should lead which working group during the U.S.-China Peaceful 
Use of Nuclear Technology dialogue is only one such example.46 
 Another weakness is the lack of regulatory independence for 
China’s nuclear watchdogs. The NEA, CAEA, and NNSA are all 
housed within larger ministries, but there is a clear imbalance of 
power among those ministries. The NEA sits in the powerful NDRC 
and therefore there are strong bureaucratic pressures backing up its 
decisions to approve new nuclear projects. The two agencies respon-
sible for ensuring the safety of those projects, however, are housed 
within ministries with much less power. The CAEA is housed within 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the NNSA 
LVWKHODUJHVWRI¿FHZLWKLQWKH0LQLVWU\RI(QYLURQPHQWDO3URWHFWLRQ
(MEP). A further complication for the NNSA is its power struggles 
45 Bo Kong and David Lampton, “Whither the Atomic Energy Law in China?”
46 Bo Kong and David M. Lampton, “China’s Nuclear Governance,” GEEI China 
Nuclear Series, No.1 (2009).
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with its own mother agency at MEP, which, plagued with worries 
WKDWWKH116$PD\VRRQHFOLSVHLWVRZQSRZHUDQGLQÀXHQFHFRQ-
stantly struggles to assert its authority and constrain the activities of 
the NNSA.47 
 $¿QDOSUREOHPLVWKDWDOORIWKHVHDJHQFLHVDUHXQGHUVWDIIHG
and underfunded. Former NNSA director and Vice Minister of MEP 
/L*DQMLHFRQ¿UPHGWKHVHFRQFHUQVE\QRWLQJWKDWEHQHDWK&KLQD¶V
trend in nuclear development “there are lots of hidden worries . . . . 
The training for professional staff is inadequate . . . we are short of 
VSHFLDOL]HGWDOHQWDQGDOVRVKRUWRIH[SHULHQFH´48 For instance, the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\UHFRJQL]HGVWDQGDUGIRUDGHTXDWHUHJXODWRU\VWDI¿QJ
is a ratio of about thirty to forty regulatory staff to every one GW of 
installed nuclear capacity. Even after its post-Fukushima expansion, 
WKH116$RQO\KDVD VWDIIRI HLJKW\¿YHPHPEHUV LQ LWVQDWLRQDO
RI¿FH SOXV  DFURVV UHJLRQDO RI¿FHV DQG DW WKHLU WHFKQLFDO
VXSSRUW FHQWHU -XVW WR NHHS SDFHZLWK WKH RI¿FLDO WDUJHW RI ¿IW\
eight GW of installed capacity by 2020, the NNSA’s staff would 
KDYHWRGRXEOHLQVL]HWREHRQSDUZLWKJOREDOVWDQGDUGV49 In terms 
RI¿QDQFHVQXFOHDU UHJXODWRUVDOVR IDFHDFKDOOHQJH ,Q WKH
NNSA’s budget was a mere 150 million RMB, less than 8 percent of 
MEP’s total budget.50 
8QVNLOOHG3HUVRQQHO
&KLQDDOVRIDFHVDVHYHUHGH¿FLWLQKXPDQFDSLWDODEOHWRRSHUDWHLWV
nuclear plants. China has only six leading universities with programs 
preparing college students for work in the nuclear industry. As of 
2004, retention in nuclear engineering programs proved challeng-




ber 20, 2010, accessed July 15, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/20/china-
nuclear-safety-idAFTOE68J04920100920.
49 Jane Nakano, “The United States and China: Making Nuclear Energy Safer,” Brook-
ings Institution, July 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/2/06%20
china%20clean%20energy/uschina%20making%20nuclear%20energy%20safer_
jnakano.pdf.
50 Bo Kong and David M. Lampton, “China’s Nuclear Governance.”
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2009 reported as many as 25,000 nuclear experts will be needed by 
2020. With plans to expand to as many as 200 to 300 reactors by 
PLGFHQWXU\&KLQDZLOOVWUXJJOHWR¿QGDGHTXDWHO\VNLOOHGSHUVRQQHO
to safely operate its nuclear power plants.51 Whether incentives from 
QXFOHDUSRZHUFRPSDQLHVVXFKDVFRPSHWLWLYHZDJHVDQGEHQH¿WV
will be enough to recruit the requisite talent remains to be seen.
The Varied Interests and Competing Motivations for 
Nuclear Expansion
Thus far the environment has been treated as one of the principal 
forces guiding China’s expansion of its civilian nuclear industry. 
While it may be an important factor, it is certainly not the only 
factor. There are myriad personal and professional interests held 
by Chinese leaders with respect to nuclear power, some comple-
mentary, others competing, and still others completely unrelated. 
From these myriad interests one can glean several major motivat-
ing factors, independent of environmental concerns, each offering 
a plausible explanation for what is driving China’s nuclear policy. 
Which motivations dominate the decision-making of policymakers 
will ultimately decide the scale and quality of any impact China’s 
nuclear power plants will have on its environment. 
6WUDWHJLFDQG(FRQRPLF0RWLYDWLRQV
The 2007 NDRC report on nuclear power lists energy security as the 
QXPEHURQHEHQH¿WRIQXFOHDUSRZHUWKHHQYLURQPHQWUDQNVVHFRQG
and right behind that is the promotion of industry and technological 
development (i.e., economic development).52   
 When it comes to energy security Chinese economic planners 
see nuclear power as a reliable and increasingly homegrown source 
of energy. Though China has depended heavily upon its abundant 
coal reserves for decades, increasingly severe transportation bottle-
QHFNVDQGVKDUSHQLQJUHDOL]DWLRQVWKDWVXFKUHVHUYHVDUH¿QLWHKDYH
51 Nakano.
52 China National Development and Reform Commission, ׏މᇖӐఀنᅡ݆ߊ




very least a supplement. To put things in perspective, China’s coal 
use in 2008 exceeded 2.91 billion tons, well above the cap of 2.7 
billion tons by 2010 set by the Eleventh Five-Year Plan on Energy 
Development.53 While production grew at a rate of 13.7 percent 
between 2000 and 2008, rail capacity grew only 8.8 percent, with 
total capacity in 2008 standing at only 1.17 billion tons annually, 
well below production levels.54 Further complicating the picture is 
the fact that 80 percent of China’s coal reserves are buried in its 
mountainous inland provinces, hundreds of miles away from the 
primary consumers along the coast.55 Nuclear power avoids most of 
these problems. Nuclear power plants can be built close to population 
centers, generating tremendous amounts of energy from relatively 
small amounts of uranium fuel that only needs to be replaced about 
once a year.  Additionally, nuclear power is becoming an increas-
LQJO\LQGLJHQL]HGLQGXVWU\ZLWK&KLQHVHVFLHQWLVWVDQGPDQXIDFWXU-
ers developing the capability to undertake the design, construction, 
fuel supply, and operation of power plants without international 
involvement. 
 With respect to economic development, China’s massive 
investments in its civilian nuclear sector may also help transform 
it into a world-leading exporter of nuclear technology and services. 
With plans to build as many as 200 to 300 reactors by midcentury, 
China will eventually obtain economies of scale in the manufac-
ture of reactors and accessory components, making it a competitive 
seller internationally. Furthermore, having adapted the Toshiba-
Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design into their own domestic 
CAP1400 and invested billions into researching alternative tech-
nologies such as the pebble-bed reactor, China will be exporting 
high-value technology that will be completely made in China. 
 Evidence of China’s global ambitions with respect to the 
nuclear industry is already apparent. A memorandum of under-
standing penned last year between the United Kingdom and China 
opened the doors for China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) 
53 Yun Zhou, “Why is China going nuclear?,” Energy Policy 38 (2010): 3755, accessed 




and China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) to begin investing 
in and building nuclear power stations in the U.K. and to have their 
reactor designs approved by British regulators.56 Last year CGN and 
CNNC purchased a combined stake of about 30 to 40 percent in 
the consortium led by Électricité de France (EDF) to build the $28 
billion Hinkley Point C power plant in southwest England.57 The 
civil nuclear agreement, signed in June 2014 by Premier Li Keqiang 
and Prime Minister David Cameron, broadened bilateral coop-
HUDWLRQE\DOORZLQJ&KLQHVH¿UPVWRDOVRRZQDQGRSHUDWH&KLQHVH
designed plants inside the U.K.58 Early reports in British press also 
suggest EDF’s Chinese partners are seeking to purchase one of its 
development sites in the coastal village of Heysham to construct 
their own plant.59 
 China has much to gain from the advancement of its nuclear 
industry, independent of any environmental considerations. If these 
strategic and economic considerations dominate nuclear policymak-
ing there is the possibility that short-term economic interests and 
parochial energy concerns could eclipse longer-term and broader 
safety and environmental interests. For example, as was already 
feared to be the case in the years leading up to the post-Fukushima 
VORZGRZQWKH1'5&LQLWV]HDOWRSURPRWHJURZWKFRXOGVSHHGWKH
approvals of new plants over the objections of rival departments 
like MEP or its subordinate agency the NNSA, opening the door to 
UXVKHG FRQVWUXFWLRQ GH¿FLHQW SODQW GHVLJQV DQG DQRYHUZKHOPHG
56*X\&KD]DQ$QRXVKD6DNRXLDQG-LP3LFNDUG³*HRUJH2VERUQHWRJLYH&KLQD
go-ahead to build nuclear power stations,” The Financial Times, October 12, 2013, 
accessed July 24, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/44ad0ee4-3295-11e3-91d2-
IHDEGHKWPOD[]]*/JR3K
57 Equivalent to £16 billion pounds under current exchange rates. Geert De Clercq and 
Karolin Schaps, “UK gives unprecedented support to £16 billion nuclear deal,” Reuters, 
October 21, 2013, accessed July 24, 2014 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/uk-
britain-nuclear-hinkley-idUKBRE99J03X20131021.
58 “Multimillion boost to UK economy as China and UK government sign civil nuclear 
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Another important dimension to consider when thinking about 
China’s nuclear policy is the often-competing interests of local 
RI¿FLDOVDQGWKRVHDWWKHFHQWHU,WLVSRVVLEOHIRUWKHVHWZRJURXSVWR
have joint aspirations for the future of nuclear power in China; for 
example, to use less coal for cleaner air. However, this is usually not 
WKHFDVHEHFDXVHRI¿FLDOVDWWKHFHQWHUDQGWKRVHLQORFDOLWLHVRSHUDWH
RQGLIIHUHQWWLPHKRUL]RQV
 In Beijing, policymakers are charged with strategic and 
long-term decision-making. They also are mindful of international 
norms and obligations. The NDRC, for example, may see approvals 
RI QXFOHDU IDFLOLWLHV DV DQ LQVWUXPHQW WR IXO¿OO QDWLRQDO HQHUJ\
demands, improve air quality, and meet climate change promises 
made by the top leadership in international agreements. The 
members of the Politburo Standing Committee may view a greater 
role for nuclear power as an indirect way of controlling growing 
social unrest, the majority of which is now motivated by discontent 
over environment issues.60 They may also be seeking to uphold and 
expand China’s international image as a technologically advanced 
and responsible world power. 
 /RFDORI¿FLDOVKRZHYHURSHUDWHRQPXFKVKRUWHUWLPHIUDPHV
with far narrower interests. With thousands of new rural migrants 
ÀRZLQJLQWRFLWLHVHDFK\HDUDV&KLQDFRQWLQXHVWRXUEDQL]HORFDO
RI¿FLDOVDUHXQGHUPRXQWLQJSUHVVXUHWRNHHSJURZWKUDWHVXSXQ-
employment numbers down, and brownouts and blackouts as infre-
quent as possible. To a mayor then, a nuclear power plant represents 
a multiyear multibillion-dollar construction project that could be 
the answer to many economic woes. Since local cadres are usually 
HYDOXDWHGIRUSURPRWLRQHYHU\¿YH\HDUVDQGDOPRVWHQWLUHO\RQWKH
basis of economic performance, they are under pressure to get as 
60 “Chinese Anger Over Pollution Becomes Main Cause of Social Unrest,” Bloomberg, 
March 6, 2013, accessed July 25, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-06/
pollution-passes-land-grievances-as-main-spark-of-china-protests.html; Jonathan Watts, 
“China blames growing social unrest on anger over pollution,” The Guardian, July 5, 
2007, accessed July 25, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/jul/06/
china.pollution.
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much done as quickly as possible. If something goes wrong once 
they have moved on to their next post, it is the successor’s problem. 
 Reforms under the new Xi Jinping administration that seek 
to broaden the criteria upon which local cadres are evaluated for 
promotions may help narrow the gap between central and local 
interests. Nevertheless, with the powers of approval, licensing, and 
oversight of operations unequally divided between three regulatory 
agencies and a fragmented bureaucracy that often stymies efforts by 
the center to control local activities, Beijing will rely heavily upon 
ORFDORI¿FLDOVWRUROORXWWKHH[SDQVLRQRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDULQGXVWU\
Whether or not this is done with environmental concerns in mind 
will depend largely upon local cadres. 
3HUVRQDO0RWLYDWLRQV
$¿QDOPRWLYDWLRQLQÀXHQFLQJWKHGHFLVLRQVRI&KLQHVHOHDGHUVZLWK
respect to nuclear power is personal gain. This includes blatantly 
LOOHJDOGHDOLQJVWKDWFDQEHFDWHJRUL]HGDVFRUUXSWLRQDQGRWKHUDF-
tivities that while suspect may not be in actual violation of the law. 
 As with all major construction projects, the future develop-
ment of hundreds of new nuclear power plants is rife with opportu-
nities for exploitation by corrupt leaders. The case of Kang Rixin, 
former general manager of CNNC and member of the Communist 
Party Central Committee, is a perfect example. Sentenced to life 
in prison in 2010, Kang was convicted of accepting bribes totaling 
$970,000 between 2004 and 2009 and suspected of bid rigging in 
nuclear power plant construction during his tenure.61 With corrup-
tion under the administration of Hu Jintao reaching unprecedented 
heights, it is likely that Kang was not alone in his shady dealings, 
merely the most prominent offender. Such an atmosphere of corrup-
tion raises obvious concerns about nuclear power plant safety. 
 Patronage and nepotism may also be fueling the support of 
Chinese leaders for nuclear power. The most conspicuous example 
involves former National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
Chairman Wu Bangguo, then ranked as the Communist Party’s 




second most powerful member, whose son-in-law Wilson Feng 
was appointed the general manager of CGN’s $1.46 billion Nuclear 
Power and New Energy Industry Investment Fund in 2009.62  
 Though having no direct ties with the nuclear power industry, 
Hu Haifeng, son of former President Hu Jintao, also has questionable 
connections. The junior Hu became the Party Secretary of Tsinghua 
Holdings in 2009 following corruption allegations leveled at one of 
its subsidiaries Nuctech, a producer of security scanning equipment 
that Hu led as president after receiving his master’s degree from 
Tsinghua University.63 Tsinghua Holdings controls more than 30 
different companies, one of which is Chinergy, a joint venture with 
China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Corporation (CNEC), 
ZKLFKZDVWDVNHGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQWWREXLOG&KLQD¶V¿UVWFRPPHU-
cial modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactor.64 The experimen-
tal reactor will be installed in the $300 million Shidaowan nuclear 
power plant being constructed in Weihai, Shandong by China 
Huaneng Group, CNEC, and Tsinghua Holdings.65 
 Jiang Mianheng, son of former President Jiang Zemin who 
LVNQRZQWRKDYHZLHOGHGJUHDWLQÀXHQFHRYHU+X-LQWDR¶VJRYHUQ-
ment, though having no business interests in the nuclear industry, 
has nonetheless developed a personal stake in the future of China’s 
nuclear policy. As President of the Shanghai branch of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences and a Vice President of the national Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS), Dr. Jiang has developed a deep pro-
IHVVLRQDODQGDFDGHPLFLQWHUHVW LQ WKH¿HOGRIQXFOHDU WHFKQRORJ\
'U -LDQJKHDGV WKHPLOOLRQ¿YH\HDU&$67KRULXP)XHOOHG
Molten Salt Reactor program launched in January 2011.66 Prior to 
62 George Chen, “UPDATE 1-Ex-Merrill banker heads China nuclear fund –sourc-
es,” Reuters, July 6, 2009, accessed July 24, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2009/07/06/merrill-china-banker-idUSHKG5510020090706. 
63 Wu Zhong, “Nepotism row threatens Wen’s legacy,” Asian Times, February 29, 2012, 
accessed July 24, 2014, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NB29Ad01.html.
64³&KLQDSODQVWREXLOGQXFOHDUSODQWVLQWKHQH[W¿YH\HDUV´Engineer Live, Febru-
ary 21, 2013, accessed July 24, 2014, http://www.engineerlive.com/content/16741.
65 “Shidaowan High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor in Shandong Province” CNEEC, 
October 22, 2011, http://www.cnecc.com/Default.aspx?tabid=639&ctl=InfoDetail&mid
 	,QIR,' 	ODQJXDJH ]K&1
66 Robert Hargraves, “LFTR Leader Jiang Mianheng Addresses ITHEO,” Energy 
From Thorium, November 4, 2012, accessed July 24, 2014, http://energyfromthorium.
com/2012/11/04/lftr-leader-jiang-mianheng-addresses-itheo/.
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that he led a Chinese delegation to the American Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory in 2010 to help Chinese researchers learn more about 
molten salt reactor technology.67 In 2012, he addressed a gathering 
of experts in Shanghai at the Thorium Energy Conference offering 
a strong defense of continued investments in nuclear energy even 
after the 2011 Fukushima incident.68 
 The above-mentioned examples are just three instances of 
KLJKUDQNLQJRI¿FLDOVZLWKSHUVRQDOLQWHUHVWVLQVHHLQJDVXFFHVVIXO
roll-out of an expanded civilian nuclear sector. There are, no doubt, 
many more to be found both throughout Hu Jintao’s tenure and even 
now under Xi Jinping’s administration. These personal motivations, 
ZKHWKHULQÀXHQFLQJOHDGHUV¶GHFLVLRQVWREHJLQWKHH[SDQVLRQRIWKH
nuclear industry or their later decisions to continue supporting the 
policy are, like short-term bureaucratic or local interests, trouble-
some in that they may distract attention away from important issues 
such as safety, quality construction, and proper regulation. 
Conclusion
China’s massive expansion of its nuclear power sector has the 
potential to at least have a tremendously ameliorating effect on its 
DLUTXDOLW\DQGPD\HYHQKHOSLQWKH¿JKWWRFRPEDWJOREDOZDUPLQJ
Thus far, however, a reluctance to wean itself off coal and a lack 
RI VSHFL¿F SROLF\ SUHVFULSWLRQV GH¿QLQJ WKH IXWXUH UHODWLRQVKLSV
between coal and nuclear power has squandered any chance of 
meaningful reductions in pollution or greenhouse gas emissions. 
Given the poor state of China’s nuclear regulatory authorities and 
LWVVHYHUHWDOHQWGH¿FLWWKHULVNRIIXWXUHLQODQGSRZHUSODQWVH[SH-
riencing some failure is undoubtedly much higher than it should be. 
Barring a catastrophe, the certain disruptive ecological effects such 
plants will have on inland rivers and lakes may come to outweigh 
the limited gains stemming from increased potable water supplies 
67 Richard Martin, “China Takes Lead in Race for Clean Nuclear Power,” Wired, Febru-
ary 1, 2011, accessed July 24, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2011/02/china-thorium-
power/.
68 Jiang Mianheng, “Why Nuclear Power in China? Thorium & the Energy Outlook of 
China” (address given at the Thorium Energy Conference 2012 [ThEC12] in Shanghai), 
accessed July 24, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iLX8jCKL9I4.
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from nuclear desalination. Worsening matters are the other motivat-
ing factors potentially driving China’s nuclear expansion. Narrow 
bureaucratic and local interests, corruption, and the pursuit of 
personal gain threaten to distract attention away from and compli-
cate important dimensions of a growing civilian nuclear industry, 
such as safety and proper regulation. Nuclear power may therefore, 
in the near- to medium-term, result in a net loss for the environment.
 That prognosis notwithstanding, China’s civilian nuclear 
industry will almost certainly see tremendous growth over the next 
few decades. There is ample support for more nuclear plant construc-
tion emanating from localities throughout China and high-ranking 
members of the central leadership continue to endorse the idea of 
future expansion. As recently as June 2014 President Xi Jinping, in 
a meeting of the Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic 
Affairs, expressed his support saying “[b]y adopting top interna-
tional standards and ensuring safety, China should lose no time in 
constructing nuclear power projects in eastern coastal regions.”69 
This shared desire for further growth has also been transmitted into 
RI¿FLDOSROLF\DQGZLOOLQFOXGHERWKFRDVWDODQGLQODQGSURMHFWV,Q
0DUFK:DQJ<XPLQGHSXW\GLUHFWRURIWKH1($DI¿UPHGWKLV
by announcing that construction on inland projects already included 
in the thirteenth Five Year Plan (2016-2020) would commence after 
coastal projects are completed. 
 The only thing likely to derail China’s plans to build 200 
to 300 reactors by midcentury is the perfection of the technol-
ogy necessary to properly exploit its enormous shale gas reserves. 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, China’s 
shale gas reserves are bigger than those of the United States and 
Canada combined—about 1,275 trillion cubic feet.70 Holding back a 
Chinese shale revolution is the lack of adequate water supplies and 
the fracking technology needed to tap those reserves. Despite the 
doubts of industry experts, the NEA has ambitious plans for China’s 
shale gas, namely to produce 2.2 trillion cubic feet annually by 
69 “China to accelerate nuclear power development,” Xinhua, June 16, 2014, accessed 
July 24, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/16/c_126627560.htm.




2020. It has already enlisted the help of some of the world’s largest 
energy companies to do it, awarding exploratory drilling rights 
to companies like Chevron, Shell, and Conoco Phillips.71 If the 
Chinese can somehow make shale gas a reliable source of energy, 
this cheaper and safer alternative might slow the pace of nuclear 
expansion.
 In any case, the pace at which new nuclear projects are 
approved is likely to remain moderate and not approach the runaway 
speed seen in the years leading up to the Fukushima incident in 
2011. Following the Japanese nuclear accident, CNNC chairman 
Sun Qin stated that China’s slowdown in approvals had “nothing to 
GRZLWKWHFKQRORJLFDOGH¿FLHQFLHVRUVDIHW\ULVNV´RQO\WKHQHHGWR
gain the public’s trust. Two years later, according to Zhang Zhuhua, 
general director of the China Nuclear Energy Association, China’s 
nuclear industry is still recovering from the bad press that followed 
Fukushima.72 Though supportive of a resumption of nuclear 
expansion, China’s top leadership is mindful of this reality and likely 
WRSURFHHGPRUHFDXWLRXVO\LQWKHQHDUIXWXUH7KLVZDVUHÀHFWHGLQ
Premier Li Keqiang’s comments on nuclear power at a meeting of 
the National Energy Commission in April 2014 where he said that 
China would “embark on new major nuclear power plant projects 
in the eastern coastal area at an appropriate time,” stressing the 
need for all projects to meet the highest safety standards.73 Whereas 
between 2005 and 2011 China had over eighty-eight active projects, 
either approved or under construction, only three new projects were 
given the green light in 2013 and only six to eight are expected to go 
through this year.74 
 Lastly, China’s landmark civil nuclear agreement with the 
United Kingdom this year is a signal of China’s determination to 
develop its civilian nuclear industry into a major new source of 
exports, both in terms of high-value technology and services. China’s 
two major nuclear corporations, CGN and CNNC will grow to 
rival other international nuclear brands like Toshiba-Westinghouse, 
71 Ibid.
72 Chang.
73 Emphasis added. Luna Lin, “Concerns over China’s nuclear power expansion,” China 




Areva, and Rosatom. There is evidence that China is already seeking 
to expand its nuclear operations to yet another continent. In his 
recent trip to Argentina in July 2014, President Xi Jinping signed 
a number of trade and investment agreements with his Argentine 
counterpart, and also announced plans for cooperation in the con-
struction of Argentina’s fourth nuclear power plant.75  
  Given the likely trajectory of China’s civilian nuclear sector, 
it would be advantageous for public safety, environmental protec-
tion, and even future business interests if several reforms were 
adopted by China’s leaders: nuclear regulatory reform, government 
VXEVLGL]HGQXFOHDUVWDIIDQGFRRUGLQDWHGHIIRUWEHWZHHQHQHUJ\DQG
environmental policies.
 Nuclear regulatory reform: Since the idea of a truly indepen-
dent agency in China’s government would probably never get off 
the ground, the next best arrangement for China’s nuclear regula-
tors (NEA, NNSA, and CAEA) would be removal from their parent 
RUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGDVXEVHTXHQWPHUJHU7KHUHVHHPVWREHQRORJLFDO
explanation for the awkward division of authority and responsibility 
metered out between these three agencies, so to simplify bureau-
cratic fragmentation they should be combined. At the very least, 
control over licensing and oversight of operations, responsibilities 
held by the NNSA and CAEA, should be bundled together. This 
new super regulator should be given the rank of a ministry and its 
GLUHFWRUVKRXOGUHSRUWGLUHFWO\WRWKH3UHPLHU$OOVWDI¿QJDSSRLQW-
ments and funding should come directly from Beijing. This would 
create a regulator as independent as possible in China, empowered 
to carry out its mandate to uphold public safety. Such an agency is 
QHFHVVDU\ WR FRXQWHUEDODQFH WKH LQÀXHQFHRI SURJURZWK DJHQFLHV
OLNHWKH1'5&DQGWKHQDUURZLQWHUHVWVRIORFDORI¿FLDOV
 Government subsidized nuclear staff: Given the estimated 
GH¿FLWLQTXDOL¿HGQXFOHDUUHJXODWRU\DQGSRZHUSODQWVWDIIWKHJRY-
ernment should act to boost interests among China’s youth in pursuing 
careers in the nuclear industry. The number of universities offering 
75 “Gov’t seeks to build fourth nuclear power station with giant,” Buenos Aires Her-
ald, July 19, 2014, accessed July 24, 2014, http://www.buenosairesherald.com/ar-
ticle/164945/gov%E2%80%99t-seeks-to-build-fourth-nuclear-power-station-with-giant; 
³&KLQD¶V;LKDLOVµQHZKRUL]RQV¶LQWLHVZLWK$UJHQWLQD´Yahoo! News, July 19, 2014, 
accessed July 24, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/china-announces-heavy-investments-
argentina-071608537.html.
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majors in nuclear related subjects should be increased. Programs 
focusing on the daily operations of nuclear facilities should be made 
more widely available at technical schools while those meant to 
nurture the talents of future researchers and policymakers should 
be made available outside of China’s top-tier colleges. Fast track 
internship-to-work programs should also be established, with local 
schools partnering with nearby nuclear facilities to prepare students 
IRUIXWXUHZRUN0RQHWDU\LQFHQWLYHVDQGEHQH¿WVVKRXOGEHVXEVL-
GL]HGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQWLQFOXGLQJFROOHJHVFKRODUVKLSVLQWHUQVKLS
stipends, and career compensation competitive with the market. The 
JRDOZRXOGEH WRSULPHWKHSXPSIRUTXDOL¿HGQXFOHDUSHUVRQQHO
creating an eventually self-sustaining interest among China’s future 
students in pursuing careers in the nuclear industry.
 Coordinated effort between energy and environmental 
policies: The expansion of nuclear power should be explicitly paired 
with a real reduction in the use of coal. Major urban areas in China’s 
coastal provinces should adopt “no coal” policies akin to Beijing’s. 
1XFOHDU IDFLOLWLHV RI VXI¿FLHQW VL]H VKRXOG EH EXLOW WR SURYLGH WKH
PDMRULW\RIWKHLUHQHUJ\QHHGVZLWKQDWXUDOJDV¿UHGSODQWVDFWLQJ
as supplementary sources of power. Gas supplies should not come 
from converted coal, but rather from natural sources through either 
imports or pipelines. 
 Done the right way, the risks and downsides of China’s 
civilian nuclear expansion can be greatly reduced. Moreover, the 
WKUHHPDLQEHQH¿WVRIQXFOHDUSRZHUQRWHGE\WKH1'5&²HQHUJ\
security, environmental protection, and economic development—




System: Evolution and the 
Cadre Evaluation System
%R/L1
Although China, starting in the 1970s, gradually established its environ-
mental management system, environmental protection was not regarded 
as a priority until the beginning of the eleventh Five-Year Social and 
Economic Development Plan. Chinese leaders have recently reformed 
WKH V\VWHP WR UHÀHFW WKH LPSRUWDQFHRI HQYLURQPHQWDOSURWHFWLRQ LQ WKH
government’s policy agenda and amended the environmental law to 
empower the environmental protection authorities. The cadre evalua-
tion system (CES) assigns targets to local leaders to guide and measure 
their performance on environmental management, and it operates in 
both top-down and bottom-up channels. Environmental governance in 
China will remain heavily dependent on the CES despite the employment 
of several market-based tools and the amendment of the environmental 
protection law. Bottom-up local autonomy can also play an important 
role in environmental governance and serve as a positive complement to 
the top-down approach.
AS CHINA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS SKYROCKETED in 
the past thirty years, this achievement has come at the expense of in-
creasing energy and resource consumption as well as environmental 
degradation. Deforestation, water scarcity, water pollution, and air 
1 Bo Li is a second-year M.A. student concentrating in Energy, Resources and Environ-
ment at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). 
Bo’s professional interests include energy and environmental governance, climate 
change adaptation, agriculture, and poverty reduction. He received his Bachelor’s 
degree in Development Economics from Peking University, China. Prior to SAIS, Bo 
interned at Oxfam Hong Kong in Beijing, where he conducted research on rural climate 
change adaptation and food security in China. Bo recently worked as a research intern 
on carbon farming at the Environmental Defense Fund in New York.  
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pollution have major economic and health costs. The depletion of 
natural resources also poses major challenges to China’s sustainable 
development.2 Having long been giving priority to economic growth, 
Chinese leaders did not take environmental efforts seriously until the 
eleventh Five-Year Plan (FYP). From 2006 to 2010, Chinese leaders 
designated environmental protection as a policy priority, setting 10 
percent binding targets on the reduction rates of both sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) and chemical oxygen demand (COD). With tremendous envi-
ronmental investment in infrastructure and pollution control, China 
outperformed on both targets during the eleventh FYP. This success 
further encouraged Chinese leaders to add the pollutants nitrogen 
oxides (NOX) and ammonium (NH4) to the environmental binding 
targets in its twelfth FYP (2011-2015). 
 Since the eleventh FYP, the implementation of China’s 
SROLFLHVRQHQYLURQPHQWDOSURWHFWLRQDQGHQHUJ\HI¿FLHQF\LVGULYHQ
by the cadre evaluation system (ganbu kaohe zhidu) (CES)—“China’s 
system for top-down bureaucratic personnel evaluation”—rather 
than by the legal system.3 Literature about China’s environmental 
management system discusses the CES separately while little work 
has been done regarding the dynamics of the CES in terms of envi-
ronmental protection.4 Although China has introduced market-based 
tools to address the environment, reformed its environmental law 
to provide legal support, and encouraged more public participation 
to engage more stakeholders, China’s environmental management 
performance will remain largely rely on the effectiveness of the 
CES. This article refers to the application of CES in environmental 
management as the environmental cadre evaluation system (ECES). 
The ECES is based on target responsibility in which environmental 
targets are allocated from the central government to local govern-
ments and the performance of the targets can be directly linked to the 
2 Lingxuan Liu, Bing Zhang, and Jun Bi, “Reforming China’s Multi-Level Environ-
mental Governance: Lessons from the 11th Five-Year Plan,” Environmental Science & 
Policy 21 (2012): 106.
3 Alex L. Wang, “The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bu-
reaucracy in China,” Harvard Environmental Law Review 37, no. 2 (2013): 368.
4 Zhen Wang, “Who Gets Promoted and Why? Understanding Power and Persuasion 
in China’s Cadre Evaluation System” (paper presented at the annual meeting for the 
American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2013); Thomas Heberer and 
René Trappel, “Evaluation Processes, Local Cadres’ Behaviour and Local Development 
Processes,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 84 (2013): 1048-1066.
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HYDOXDWLRQRI ORFDORI¿FLDOV7KHUHIRUHXQGHUVWDQGLQJKRZWDUJHWV
work within the ECES is key to Chinese environmental governance. 
First, I examine the general evolutionary trends of China’s environ-
mental management system since the 1970s. Second, I discuss how 
the ECES works from both top-down and bottom-up channels in 
environmental governance. Finally, I study how Chinese leaders are 
¿[LQJWKHSUREOHPVZLWKWKH(&(6
Evolution of China’s Environmental Management 
System 
China began to take environmental management seriously when it 
¿UVW DWWHQGHG WKH6WRFNKROP&RQIHUHQFHRQ+XPDQ'HYHORSPHQW
in 1972.5 According to Dr. Bao Maohong, a Peking University 
professor, three milestones paved the way for environmental con-
sciousness.6 In 1973, the National Environmental Protection Agency 
(NEPA) was established under the Ministry of Rural and Urban 
&RQVWUXFWLRQ,QWKHVDPH\HDUWKH6WDWH&RXQFLOFRQYHQHGWKH¿UVW
national environmental protection conference and decided to draft 
national environmental protection plans. In 1976, China released 
a Ten-Year Environmental Protection Plan, which put forward 
JRDOVRIFRQWUROOLQJHQYLURQPHQWDOSROOXWLRQZLWKLQ¿YH\HDUVDQG
reducing pollution to an acceptable level in ten years.7 The goals 
obviously underestimated the complexity of environmental protec-
tion, especially in the context of economic development, and were 
not achieved. 
 Since the reform and opening policy of the late 1970s, 
China, motivated by this burgeoning environmental consciousness, 
has taken a number of important steps in environmental protection. 
The Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of 
China was introduced in 1979 for trial implementation and more 
5*XL]KHQ+H<RQJORQJ/X$UWKXU3-0RODQG7KHR%HFNHUV³&KDQJHVDQG&KDO-
lenges: China’s Environmental Management in Transition,” Environmental Develop-
ment 3 (2012): 29.
6 Maohong Bao, “The Evolution of Environmental Policy and its Impact in the People’s 
Republic of China,” Conservation and Society 4, no. 1 (2006): 36.
7 Rongqing Sun, “The Development of Five-Year Plans on Environmental Protection,” 
Sina, August 9, 2012, http://gongyi.sina.com.cn/greenlife/2012-08-09/100536596.html.            
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pieces of environmental legislation on various subjects including 
water, forest, and air were developed later. Environmental protec-
WLRQZDVIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHLQFOXGHGDVDFKDSWHULQWRWKHQDWLRQDO)<3
in the sixth FYP in 1982. In 1986, an independent Five-Year Plan 
on Environmental Protection was drafted based on the seventh FYP. 
The NEPA was elevated to a vice-ministerial governing agency in-
dependent from the Ministry of Rural and Urban Construction in 
1988. A year later, the Environmental Protection Law of the People's 
Republic of China was amended and formally established, and 
remains widely used.8  
 Since the 1990s, Beijing developed more policies and in-
stitutions to address environmental protection. In 1992, China 
EHFDPHWKH¿UVWGHYHORSLQJFRXQWU\WRRI¿FLDOO\SXUVXHVXVWDLQDEOH
development when it published “China’s Ten Strategic Policies on 
(QYLURQPHQW DQG 'HYHORSPHQW´ ]KRQJJXR KXDQMLQJ \X ID]KDQ
shida duice). Later, in 1994, the Chinese government published 
Agenda 21, which laid out the main strategic frameworks and goals 
IRU&KLQD¶VVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWLQWKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\,Q
1998, the NEPA was upgraded and renamed the State Environmental 
Protection Administration (SEPA), accruing more power and re-
sponsibility.9 Market-based tools were introduced in the late 1990s. 
,Q&KLQDLQLWLDWHGLWV¿UVWHPLVVLRQWUDGLQJVFKHPH
 &KLQHVHOHDGHUVEHJDQWRUHFRJQL]HWKHVWUDWHJLFUHODWLRQVKLS
between economic development and environmental protection in 
WKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\7KHWHQWK)<3RQ(QYLURQPHQWDO3URWHFWLRQ
put forward six main pollutant control targets, but the targets were 
not completely achieved.10 The biggest transition came in 2005 
when top leaders began to regard environmental protection as an 
important national policy priority. The Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) Politburo and the State Council, the top decision makers 
in China, reviewed and commented on the eleventh national FYP, 
ZKLFKIROORZLQJWKH³6FLHQWL¿F$SSURDFKWR'HYHORSPHQW´OLVWHG
environmental targets as binding targets that are closely related 
to the local CES.11 In 2008, SEPA was again upgraded, renamed 
8 He, Lu, Mol, and Beckers, 30.                                            
9 Ibid., 30.                                             
10 Sun.                                            
11 Ibid.                                           
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the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), and given more 
political power and responsibilities. China made further efforts 
toward a green economy in the twelfth FYP, designating one third 
of the total targets as resource and environment targets.12  
 China has made huge progress on environmental governance 
through various administrative reforms in environmental planning, 
infrastructure investment, the ECES, and institutional support. 
Environmental protection work evolved from pollution control 
EHIRUHWKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\WRFXUUHQWO\LQWHJUDWLQJHFRQRPLFGH-
velopment and environmental protection. Environmental protection 
has matured from a side effect of economic development to one of 
the key policy priorities. Environmental targets have become more 
comprehensive and realistic within the context of economic growth. 
In addition to the target-based mandates on environmental protec-
tion, China has also made progress on the reform of environmental 
laws. Since 1979, the National People’s Congress and its Standing 
Committee have passed twenty-nine pieces of environment-related 
legislation, accounting for about 10 percent of total pieces of leg-
islation in the same period.13 Nevertheless, the weak enforcement 
prevents the legal system from having a large impact on the ground. 
 $OWKRXJKHQYLURQPHQWDOSODQQLQJKDVHYROYHGVLJQL¿FDQWO\
in the past four decades, the implementation of environmental 
SROLFLHV DW WKH VXEQDWLRQDO OHYHO LV ZLGHO\ UHFRJQL]HG DV D ELJ
problem in China.14 The new Environmental Protection Law passed 
in April 2014 strengthened the capacity of environmental protec-
WLRQEXUHDXVDQGDOORZHGPRUHVRFLDORUJDQL]DWLRQVWR¿OHODZVXLWV
against polluters; however, the law still does not allow lawsuits 
against authorities who enforce the environmental law. How to 
supervise the environmental protection bureaus and make sure they 
enforce the law effectively remains unclear. Therefore, to reduce 
12 Mark Fulton, 12th Five Year Plan – Chinese Leadership Towards a Low Carbon 
Economy (Deutsche Bank Group, April 4, 2011), 1, http://wwww.blah.com/cr/en/docs/
China_12th_Five_Year_Plan.pdf.
13 Jin Wang, “China’s Green Laws Are Useless,” China Dialogue, September 23, 2010, 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/3831--China-s-green-laws-are-
useless-.                                          
142UJDQL]DWLRQIRU(FRQRPLF&RRSHUDWLRQDQG'HYHORSPHQWOECD Environmental 
Performance Reviews: China 2007 (OECD, 2007), 17; Wang, “The Search for Sustain-
able Legitimacy,” 367.  
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the implementation gap in environmental regulations, the current 
ECES may be one of the few solutions in China’s environmental 
management system. 
The Environmental Cadre Evaluation System in China
The CES is an important government personnel management 
V\VWHP LQ ZKLFK ORZHU OHYHO JRYHUQPHQW RI¿FLDOV DUH HYDOXDWHG
XVLQJ SHUIRUPDQFH WDUJHWV GHWHUPLQHG E\ JRYHUQPHQW RI¿FLDOV
one level above them.15 For example, the provincial government 
is fully responsible for evaluating the municipal level government 
RI¿FLDOVDSSURYDOIURPWKHFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQW LVQRWQHFHVVDU\16 
Local cadres take the system seriously since it is closely related to 
their career advancement and salary.17 It is also an important tool 
to address the principal-agent problem in Chinese politics, serving 
as an “instrument of higher level to control lower-level agents and 
to regulate central-local relations.”18 There have been many studies 
on the CES in China; however, few of them have focused on the 
environmental aspect of the system.19 In the past forty years of envi-
ronmental protection reform, instead of turning to the legal system, 
Chinese leaders have decided to elevate environmental priorities in 
the CES.20 The discussion of China’s ECES in this article is based 
both on current literature and twenty-six interviews with local gov-
HUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVLQRQHPXQLFLSDOLW\RQHGLVWULFWDQGWZRFRXQWLHV
in Hunan Province in 2012. 
 The most important way to develop the ECES is to assign 
KDUGHQYLURQPHQWDOWDUJHWVWRORFDOJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVDQGLQFRU-
porate environmental targets into local cadres’ evaluations. Starting 
15 Wang, “Who Gets Promoted and Why,” 4. 
16 Ibid., 5.
17&DUO)0LQ]QHU³5LRWVDQG&RYHU8SV&RXQWHUSURGXFWLYH&RQWURORI/RFDO$JHQWV
in China,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 31 (2009): 57.
18 Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Manage-
ment from a Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly 173 (2003): 36.
19+HEHUHUDQG7UDSSHO0LQ]QHU6XVDQ:KLWLQJ³7KH&DGUH
Evaluation System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule,” in Barry Naughton 
and Dali Yang, eds., Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the 
Post-Deng Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 101; Wang, “Who Gets 
Promoted and Why,” 1-49.
20 Wang, “The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy,” 368.
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IURP WKH HOHYHQWK )<3 HQYLURQPHQWDO DQG HQHUJ\ WDUJHWV ¿UVW
became the binding (yueshu xing) targets that would have a large 
impact on their performance evaluation.21 In December 2013, China 
also reformed its CES to include more comprehensive standards 
including environmental protection, energy conservation, and local 
government debt to meet the changing environmental target priori-
WLHVZKLFKLQFHQWLYL]HGORFDOFDGUHVWRYDOXHHQYLURQPHQWDOHIIRUWV
and hence marked major progress in the development of the ECES. 
 Past literature studying the ECES focuses more on top-down 
channels to guarantee that local cadres are in line with the policy 
priorities determined by the higher levels of government than on 
bottom-up local autonomy.22 Local autonomy is often regarded as 
the principal-agent problem generated from the top-down approach. 
I argue, however, that bottom-up local autonomy can play an 
important role in the ECES and serve as a positive complement to 
the top-down approach. 
7RSĦ'RZQ&RQWURO
Higher levels of government design environmental targets before 
WKH\DUHDOORFDWHGGRZQ WR WKH ORZHU OHYHOV WKURXJKRI¿FLDOSODQV
and regulations. This suggests a heavy reliance on the target-based 
DSSURDFKZKLFKKDVFHUWDLQEHQH¿WV)LUVW HQYLURQPHQWDOSURWHF-
tion can quickly become the policy priority of local governments.23 
Lower level governments will not only integrate all the important 
targets set by the central government into their own plans, but also 
SULRULWL]HGLIIHUHQWWDUJHWVGHSHQGLQJRQZKHWKHUWKH\DUHELQGLQJRU
expected targets. As a consequence, it is relatively easy for leaders 
in the higher-level government to enforce their ideas in practice by 
setting binding targets within the ECES. The tremendous environ-
mental achievements made by local governments during the eleventh 
FYP is a good example of how much local cadres can achieve in 
terms of environmental protection when they treat environmental 
21%LQGLQJWDUJHWVDUH³KDUG´WDUJHWVWKDWRI¿FLDOVPXVWDFKLHYHH[SHFWHGWDUJHWVDUH
³VRIW´WDUJHWV/RFDORI¿FLDOVZLOOJHWSXQLVKHGLIWKH\GRQRWDFKLHYHWKHELQGLQJWDU-
gets; however, not achieving the expected targets is acceptable in the CES.
22:DQJ³7KH6HDUFKIRU6XVWDLQDEOH/HJLWLPDF\´0LQ]QHU
23 Genia Kostka, “China’s Evolving Green Planning System: Are Targets the Answer?” 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Working Paper No. 201 (2013): 9.                              
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protection as a policy priority.
 Second, the reporting of environmental target achievements 
can serve as an important way for the CCP to deliver performance 
legitimacy.24 The CCP has long been using rapid economic growth 
to justify its rule; with the increasing demand for a clean environ-
ment, environmental management can be an important new source 
of legitimacy.25 The OECD’s 2007 report on China’s environmental 
performance concluded that “since the early 1990s, the public has 
EHHQLQFUHDVLQJO\H[SUHVVLQJLWVGHVLUHWRLQÀXHQFHSXEOLFSROLFLHV´
as the Chinese media cover public environmental protests and peti-
tions.26 According to a report from China Dialogue, “the number of 
environmental protests has increased by an average of 29% every 
year since 1996.”27 Over 300,000 environmental petitions were 
received during the eleventh FYP period.28 To meet the increasing 
demand for a cleaner environment, the reporting of environmental 
target achievements can help ease social unrest. 
 Third, the top-down control of the ECES also suggests a 
heavy reliance on leaders’ disposition towards the environment, 
which can boost environmental protection in cities fortunate enough 
to have an environmentally-minded mayor. For example, in cities 
like Dalian and Shaanxi, mayors have made the environment a top 
priority and, thus, “their EPBs (Environmental Protection Bureaus) 
possess enough clout to persuade other bureaus to engage in coop-
erative activities.”29$QLQWHUYLHZZLWKORFDORI¿FLDOVLQRQHPXQLFL-
pality in Hunan Province reveals this:
Our party secretary used to say this during one meeting 
with all the mayors in Hunan Province about environmental 
protection: “If the mayor of a municipality in Hunan cannot 
reach the environmental targets, he should be sent to be the 
24 Ibid., 10; Wang, “The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy,” 398. 
25 Wang, “The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy,” 395.
26 OECD, 15.
27-LH)HQJDQG7DR:DQJ³2I¿FLDO6WUXJJOLQJWR5HVSRQGWR&KLQD¶V<HDURI(QYLURQ-
ment Protests,” China Dialogue, June 12, 2012, https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/
VKRZVLQJOHHQ2I¿FLDOVVWUXJJOLQJWRUHVSRQGWR&KLQDV\HDURIHQYLURQPHQW
protests-.      
28 Feng and Wang.
29(OL]DEHWK&(FRQRP\The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to 
China’s Future (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 119. 
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leader of the sewage treatment plant.30  
 The heavy reliance on the dispositions of local leaders 
towards the environment, however, can also play a negative role 
in environmental management if local leaders are not highly sup-
portive of environmental protection. 
 Fourth, at the central level, the implication of top-down 
control on environmental protection is more obvious. Before the 
eleventh FYP, there was a paradox: the expansion of environmental 
laws and regulations and the increasing power of Chinese environ-
mental protection bureaus occurred simultaneously as centrally-
mandated environmental policies were poorly implemented at 
the local level. Inadequate resolve at the central level to solve the 
SULQFLSDODJHQWSUREOHP LQ WKHHQYLURQPHQWDO¿HOGFUHDWHG LPSOH-
mentation gaps. Although the central government perceived envi-
ronmental protection as a growing threat, its unwillingness to make 
a real move through the ECES has led to the implementation gap 
before the eleventh FYP. 
 Once the central government began to take environmen-
tal protection seriously and set environmental targets through the 
(&(6WKHRXWFRPHVRIHQYLURQPHQWDOZRUNVLJQL¿FDQWO\FKDQJHG
From 2006 to 2011, China reduced the emissions of CO2 and SO2 
by 12.45 percent and 14.29 percent respectively, outperforming the 
10 percent targets for both pollutants. More cleaning equipment was 
installed in factories and the rate of urban sewage treatment rose 
from 52 percent to 72 percent.31 Therefore, the top-down approach 
in the ECES could help to address the principal-agent problem in 
environmental governance if the central government is determined 
to make the environment one of its top priorities. 
%RWWRPĦ8S/RFDO$XWRQRP\
/RFDODXWRQRP\FDQEHGH¿QHGDVERWK ORZHU OHYHOJRYHUQPHQWV¶
“right to interpret” and their bottom-up feedback process to superior 
levels of government.32 Current literature tends to focus more on 
30,QWHUYLHZZLWKPXQLFLSDOLW\OHYHOORFDORI¿FLDOLQ+XQDQ3URYLQFH0D\
31 The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China “National 12th 
Five-Year Plan on Environmental Protection,” December 15, 2011, http://www.gov.cn/
]ZJNFRQWHQWBKWP
32 Wang, “Who Gets Promoted and Why,” 33.                       
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the top-down aspect of the CES while considering the impact of 
bottom-up local autonomy as part of the principal-agent problem.33 
While local autonomy generates problems, including deviations and 
goal displacement in environmental policy implementation,34 local 
autonomy can also be a necessary complement to top-down control 
and should also include public feedback about environmental issues 
through complaints, petitions, and protests. 
 The “right to interpret” means that the higher tier govern-
ments usually dictate more general topics and agendas and the lower 
levels government can interpret the general guidelines, taking into 
DFFRXQWWKHVSHFL¿FORFDOFKDOOHQJHV/RFDOJRYHUQPHQWVDUHRIWHQ
JLYHQVXI¿FLHQWÀH[LELOLW\WRPDLQWDLQVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOVWDELOLW\
through rapid economic growth.35 Sometimes, local governments 
may address environmental issues even though they are not listed as 
binding targets by the upper level. For example, the Hunan provin-
cial government set a binding target of a 15 percent reduction rate in 
lead emissions during the twelfth FYP period (2011-2015), though 
the FYP does not list such a target.36 This is also the case from the 
provincial to municipal level. One municipality may not necessar-
LO\SULRULWL]HDOO WKH WDVNV LQ WKHSURYLQFLDO WZHOIWK)<3UHODWHG WR
HQYLURQPHQWDOSURWHFWLRQEXWWKH\ZLOOSULRULWL]HDFFRUGLQJWRWKHLU
own urgent environmental problems when designing the municipal 
twelfth FYP on environmental protection. 
 The bottom-up feedback process is the other important 
aspect of local autonomy. Lower levels of government have the right 
to negotiate with higher levels of government, especially concern-
ing the allocation of environmental targets. Interviews with county 
RI¿FLDOVZKRGLGQRWPHHWWKHWDUJHWVRIHQHUJ\FRQVHUYDWLRQLQWKH
eleventh FYP (2006-2011) demonstrate this: 
The municipal government introduced a large power plant 
in 2007; therefore there was no way we could achieve the 
33 Kenneth Lieberthal, “China’s Governing System and its Impact on Environmental 
Policy Implementation,” China Environment Series 1 (1997), 3-8.
34 Xueguang Zhou, “The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governments in 
China,” Modern China 36, no. 1 (January 2010): 47.
35 Lieberthal, 3.    
36 Hunan Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau, “The 12th FYP on Environmen-
tal Protection of Hunan Province,” June 5, 2012, http://www.hbt.hunan.gov.cn/new/
JKFZ]KJKFRQWHQWBKWPO
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energy conservation targets. Although most of the taxes of 
the enterprise went to the municipal government, we have to 
be responsible for their energy consumption. This was unfair 
to us. Our leaders talked to the municipal government and 
they reached an agreement that as long as the municipality as 
a whole achieved its energy conservation target assigned by 
the provincial government, we would not be punished by the 
municipal government.37  
 In another county, the county government originally assigned 
all the township governments with the same energy conservation 
targets to “test their responses.” After receiving comments from 
different township governments, the county government revised 
WKH WDUJHWDOORFDWLRQ WR UHÀHFW WKHGLIIHUHQWHFRQRPLFVLWXDWLRQV LQ
various towns. Towns with more industries ended up receiving higher 
targets.38 Local governments are intentionally taking advantage of 
WKHERWWRPXSIHHGEDFNSURFHVVWRLQÀXHQFHWKHLUVXSHULRUV
 Bottom-up local autonomy also involves feedback from the 
public. In the past, there was an underlying political and economic 
deal to maintain social stability through economic growth;39 
however, over the years, leaders in China have observed the shift 
that the environment has become a top concern fueling the increas-
ingly frequent environmental protests. An interview with the EPB at 
RQHPXQLFLSDOLW\LQ+XQDQ3URYLQFHFRQ¿UPVWKLVWUHQG
Starting from last year [2011], the provincial statistic 
bureau would conduct a survey about the satisfaction of 
the environment in different cities in Hunan province. 
The survey is conducted mainly through a statistics 
company randomly calling people in different cities. 
There are a number of indicators measuring people’s 
satisfaction and awareness about the environment. Last 
year, our target for the environmental satisfaction rate 
was over 70 percent. This target would be included in 
our evaluation (kaohe) system and is also a fair and 
37,QWHUYLHZZLWKFRXQW\RI¿FLDO0D\
38 Ibid.
39 Lieberthal, 4-5.             
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FRQYLQFLQJWDUJHWWRUHÀHFWWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOVLWXDWLRQ
in different cities. However, this new target has also 
brought us a lot of pressure since it was set last year.40
 Nationwide, the environmental complaints from the public 
can upgrade to protests if not managed well. There have been more 
environmental demonstrations in recent years. Environmental 
incidents in 2005 took the form of repeated mass petitioning over en-
vironmental pollution in Dongyang, eastern China.41 Later in 2007, 
FLWL]HQVLQ;LDPHQPDGHWKHLUYRLFHVKHDUGDOORYHUWKHFRXQWU\E\
protesting over a plant using paraxylene (PX)—a chemical used to 
make polyester products. In 2011, there was another protest against 
PX in Dalian, northeastern China. Environmental protests have 
escalated since 2012. Within the span of four months, three massive 
protests erupted in Ningbo, Shifang, and Qidong. Protests can also 
devolve into physical clashes with the government and police and 
lead to social disorder.42 These environmental petitions and protests 
UHÀHFWWKHLQFUHDVLQJGHPDQGIRUDFOHDQHQYLURQPHQWDQGPRVWLP-
portantly, have pushed the Chinese leaders to accelerate the reform 
of the ECES.  
Current Challenges
Although the ECES plays an important role in environmental 
policy implementation in China, it has a number of limitations and 
GUDZEDFNV ,W LV LPSRUWDQW WR UHFRJQL]H ZKDW WKH V\VWHP FDQQRW
achieve in environmental governance. The ECES today still faces 
principal-agent problems including data collection issues and 
cyclical behavior, the weakening of top-down control, and the lack 
of punishment for underperformance. 





41 Feng and Wang.
42 Liu, Zhang and Bi, 109.         
43 Kostka, 14-17.
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The design of environmental targets is essential to environmental 
protection work, as the targets guide the fundamental directions of 
ORFDOHQYLURQPHQWDOSROLF\7KHXQVFLHQWL¿FDOORFDWLRQRIHQYLURQ-
mental targets has huge implications for local environmental efforts. 
2QH RI¿FLDO IURP D FRXQW\ (3% UHSRUWHG WKDW GHVSLWH DFKLHYLQJ
more COD reduction than their target during the eleventh FYP, they 
chose not to report it to upper government in order to leave some 
room for the twelfth FYP.447DUJHWDOORFDWLRQFDQEHLQÀDWHGZKHQ
passing down from a higher level to a lower level. Instead of setting 
their own targets, lower level governments are often assigned higher 
targets by their superiors to allow for potential failure of environ-
mental efforts or the potential for investigations by national inspec-
tion teams.452QHORFDORI¿FLDODGPLWWHGWKDW³ZKHQWKHXSSHUOHYHO
government has a certain target, the lower level will most likely end 
up with a target higher than the upper level.”46  
 /RFDO RI¿FLDOV¶ F\FOLFDO EHKDYLRU PHDQV WKDW WKH\ WHQG
to adopt a loose environmental policy while the implementation 




know that they may only stay in the same position for one or two 
years before a promotion or relocation. The short-term mindset 
has created incentives for local cadres to leave the pressure of en-
vironmental target achievement to their successor.47 The achieve-
ment of the energy consumption target during the eleventh FYP is a 
perfect example. Zhang Ping, the head of the National Development 
and Reform Commission, admitted during the National People’s 
Congress in 2011, that some local governments cut off electricity 
and shut down industries at the last minute in order to achieve their 
44,QWHUYLHZZLWK(QYLURQPHQWDO3URWHFWLRQ%XUHDXRI¿FLDODWWKHFRXQW\OHYHO0D\
2012.
45 Kostka, 14. 
46,QWHUYLHZZLWK'HYHORSPHQWDQG5HIRUP&RPPLVVLRQRI¿FLDODWWKHFRXQW\OHYHO
May 21, 2012.
47 This political logic affects not only environmental policies, but local governance more 
broadly. For examples, refer to Joseph Fewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political 
Reform in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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energy targets.48  
 Second, there are negative impacts of the local autonomy of 
the ECES. One problem is that local autonomy may undermine the 
effectiveness of the top-down control of the ECES. For example, 
local cadres may still consider a high economic growth rate as their 
top priority at the local level, rather than environmental protection. 
This is especially true when the CES fails to address the sequence of 
policy priorities correctly and local cadres have no real incentives to 
follow the priorities proposed by the central leaders. Another issue 
LV WKDW WKHKLJKÀH[LELOLW\RI WKH(&(6PD\DOORZORFDOFDGUHV WR
disregard some environmental targets with impunity. My interviews 
LQ+XQDQSURYLQFHIRXQGWKDWQRORFDORI¿FLDOVUHFHLYHGSXQLVKPHQW
for not achieving the environmental targets, even though some of 
WKHP GLG IDLO WRPHHW WKH ELQGLQJ WDUJHWV7KLV LQFHQWLYL]HV ORFDO
cadres to relegate environmental management to a lower priority. 
 Third, since the ECES relies on target achievement metrics, 
some environmental problems can be ignored if they are not included 
LQ WKH HQYLURQPHQWDO WDUJHWV 7KH (&(6 XUJHV ORFDO RI¿FLDOV WR
follow the agenda set by the central government, but many envi-
ronmental problems are not listed as binding targets in the FYP. A 
FRXQW\(3%RI¿FLDO WDONHGDERXW30 3DUWLFXODWH0DWWHUXS WR
PLFURPHWHUVLQVL]HDVDQH[DPSOH
The requirements of certain environmental targets should be 
updated with the economic development. The national level 
EPB is working on PM2.5 while the county level could hardy 
make its voice heard on this topic. Only when the national 
level began to promote this, then our county level could 
follow its instruction. Now we do not have the technology to 
measure PM2.5, but the equipment might be added at the end 
of this year.49 
The ECES may not include all the important environmental issues, 
48 Zhaojun Zhou and Yan Shi, “Zhang Ping Reviewed the Implementation of En-
ergy Saving and Emission Reduction during the 11th Five Year Plan,” China 





which is also why public supervision is needed to promote the 
ERWWRPXSFKDQQHOWRUHÀHFWXUJHQWHQYLURQPHQWDOSUREOHPVWKDWDUH
not listed on the government’s environmental agenda.   
Recent Environmental Reforms in China
Reforming the CES into a more sustainable system that addresses 
current environmental challenges in China has been discussed 
for at least a decade. In order to address new problems emerging 
from the rapid economic growth in recent years, Chinese leaders 
further reformed the local CES in December 2013.50,WZDVWKH¿UVW
WLPHWKDWRI¿FLDOUHJXODWLRQVH[SOLFLWO\VDLGWKDW*'3SHUIRUPDQFH
should not be used as the only criterion in cadre evaluation. Central 
leadership called for a more comprehensive evaluation system that 
would increase the weight on local cadres’ performance in energy 
consumption, environmental protection, safe production, and local 
government debt in order to meet the changing environmental target 
priorities.51  
 One important reason for the reform of the CES is that 
the original CES failed to support the changing policy priorities. 
Environmental management had become a policy priority since the 
HOHYHQWK)<3EXW WKH&(6ZDVQRWXSGDWHG WR UHÀHFW WKLV SROLF\
change. As the Chinese environmental management system is 
largely based on the ECES, it is therefore important to reform the 
CES in order to keep up with the policy shift. In addition, other 
problems, including government debt and safe production, are also 
drivers of the recent CES reform. 
 Another important reform is the updated Environmental 
Law passed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
&RQJUHVV LQ$SULO 7KH QHZ ODZ DOORZVPRUH RUJDQL]DWLRQV
to bring a public interest lawsuit against polluters and gives envi-
ronmental protection agencies more administrative power to punish 
polluters. For example, now “around 300 green NGOs that are 
50 See “ܸ჆١֛׀࣐ۆᆦ਼֤ϲሷۋ਼֤ދҍᆦࠢॐ܄މቛ֬๠ᆰ,” http://renshi.
people.com.cn/n/2013/1210/c139617-23793409.html.
512UJDQL]DWLRQ'HSDUWPHQWRIWKH&3&&HQWUDO&RPPLWWHH³1RWLFHRQ,PSURYLQJWKH
Local Cadre Evaluation System,” CPC News, December 10, 2013, http://renshi.people.
com.cn/n/2013/1210/c139617-23793409.html. 
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registered at city level, and aren’t known to have breached any laws 
RU UHJXODWLRQV IRU WKHSDVW¿YH\HDUV DUHJLYHQ WKH ULJKW WREULQJ
public interest lawsuits.”52 
 &KLQHVH OHDGHUV DUH DOVR WU\LQJ WR¿[ SUREOHPV HPEHGGHG
LQWKHWDUJHWEDVHGDSSURDFKZLWKLQWKH(&(6SDUWLFXODUO\¿QGLQJ
ways to reconcile short-term and long-term interests of local cadres. 
)RUH[DPSOHLQRUGHUWRDGGUHVVORFDORI¿FLDOV¶F\FOLFDOEHKDYLRUV
ORFDOJRYHUQPHQWVKDYHEHJXQWRGLYLGHWKH¿YH\HDUELQGLQJWDUJHWV
into annual targets. This can prevent local leaders from underper-
forming in the early years in the FYP period and catching up later. 
 The reform of the CES, together with the new environmental 
law, seems to have had an obvious impact on China’s environmen-
tal governance. Since 2014, a number of local cadres have been 
punished for misbehavior in environmental governance. In February, 
a township party secretary in Hebei Province was dismissed from 
his position because of public complaints about the inferior environ-
ment from poor garbage disposal.53 In May, the MEP announced 
WKDWDQXPEHURIJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVDWDFRXQWU\HQYLURQPHQWDO
protection bureau in Jiangsu Province were punished because of the 
local environmental pollution.54 
Conclusion
Over the past four decades, China has made remarkable achieve-
ments on economic growth; environmental management in China 
started before the economic reform in the 1970s and slowly grew 
with the reform of environmental protection institutions. The strategy 
evolved from controlling pollution in the early years to integrating 
economic development and environmental protection in recent 
years. The performance of environmental management, however, 
52 Jiangqiang Liu, “China’s New Environmental Law Looks Good on Paper,” China 
Dialogue, April 24, 2014, https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/6937-China-s-new-envi-
ronmental-law-looks-good-on-paper/en. 
53 “A Party Secretary was Dismissed because of Environmental Issue in Heshui, Hebei 
Province,” Hebei News, February 19, 2014, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/02-
19/5856932.shtml. 




did not start to catch up with the huge economic achievements until 
the eleventh FYP, when environmental governance became a policy 
priority. 
 Chinese leaders have used the ECES as an important way to 
address the implementation gap in environmental management. The 
system operates through both top-down control and bottom-up local 
autonomy. The top-down approach allocates targets from higher 
levels of governments to lower levels and implies a heavy reliance 
on leaders’ dispositions towards environmental protection. At the 
VDPH WLPH WKH WRSGRZQ DSSURDFK FDQ SULRULWL]H HQYLURQPHQWDO
work on local governments’ agendas. Moreover, the reporting of 
achieved targets can be a tool to demonstrate the CCP’s performance 
legitimacy. The bottom-up local autonomy includes both the local 
governments’ right to interpret general policies and the feedback 
process from lower levels of government to higher levels of govern-
ment. The current ECES, however, still faces a lot of challenges from 
SULQFLSDODJHQWSUREOHPVVXFKDVXQVFLHQWL¿FDQGLQÀDWHGWDUJHWV
WKHF\FOLFDOEHKDYLRURIRI¿FLDOVDQGWKHGHFOLQLQJHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI
the top-down approach. 
  There are many avenues of research regarding China’s 
environmental management system yet to be explored. Although 
WKH EHJLQQLQJ RI ZLWQHVVHG VRPH ORFDO RI¿FLDOV²HVSHFLDOO\
RI¿FLDOV LQ (3%V²EHLQJ KHOG DFFRXQWDEOH IRU HQYLURQPHQWDO
issues, the overall trend of China’s environmental management is 
still unclear. What is the potential relationship between the CCP’s 
anti-corruption campaign and the current round of environmental 
DFFRXQWDELOLW\ UHIRUPV DPRQJ ORFDO RI¿FLDOV" &DQ HQYLURQPHQWDO
policies implemented in eastern China be transplanted to central and 
western provinces? This article discusses environmental protests in 
recent years, but how will the role of public participation cause the 
evolution of China’s future environmental governance system? Even 
though the new environmental law allows more public participation 
in environmental management, there persists a lack of supervision 
in the environmental agencies that actually enforces the law. How 
effectively Chinese leaders use the ECES to address the lack of su-
pervision is another question. 
 Recent reforms of China’s environmental management 
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system, including the reform of the CES and the introduction of 
new environmental law, have tried to solve the implementation gap 
in environmental governance. The recent reform of the CES creates 
more incentives for local cadres to treat environmental management 
as a priority. The recent amended environmental law granted the 
EPBs more responsibilities and powers and strengthened the EPB’s 
capacity to enforce laws and regulations. With both the incentive 
and the capacity, China could be expected to make a change in envi-




A Comparative Analysis of EU 
and Chinese Emission Trading 
Systems
,ODULD0D]]RFFR1 
Over the course of 2013 and 2014, seven pilot emission trading systems 
(ETSs) were launched in various cities and regions in China. This 
represents a huge potential testing ground for market-based solutions 
to pollution, both in China and internationally. In aggregate, the pilot 
markets represent the second largest cap and trade program in the world 
by emissions—second only to the EU ETS, which has been in place since 
2005. Lax enforcement, limited technical expertise, and gaps in the legal 
DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO IUDPHZRUNFRXOGKRZHYHUXQGHUPLQH WKHSURMHFW%\
comparing the evolution of the ETS, relevant laws and policies, as well 
as institutional capacity for China’s ETS and the EU ETS, the paper iden-
WL¿HV FKDOOHQJHV DQG RSSRUWXQLWLHV IDFLQJ SROLF\PDNHUV ,Q SDUWLFXODU
the lack of central planning could have potentially damaging effects in 
the long-term even as it facilitates experimentation in the initial phase. 
Further collaboration between the EU and China on climate change and 
VSHFL¿FDOO\(76FRXOGLPSURYHWKHORQJWHUPSURVSHFWVRIERWKV\VWHPV
AS GOVERNMENTS COME UNDER INCREASING pressure 
to address environmental issues without undermining economic 
growth, they are turning to policy tools such as emission trading 
V\VWHPV(76VZKLFKDUHVHHQDVPRUHHI¿FLHQWWKDQSXUHUHJXOD-
tion and more business-friendly than taxation. The development of 
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emission trading over the past few decades has been largely shaped 
by the interaction between academia, policy-making, and environ-
mental activism. In many ways, its intellectual foundations lie in 
Ronald Coase’s writings on property rights, developed in reaction to 
theories proposing to eliminate negative externalities from economic 
production through taxation.2 According to Coase’s argument, the 
PRVWHI¿FLHQWDOORFDWLRQRIUHVRXUFHVDQGOHYHORIRXWSXW²LQFOXGLQJ
social costs such as pollution—can be obtained by clearly estab-
lishing property rights and a functioning market. Some economists 
throughout the 1960s and 70s, including John Dales, applied 
&RDVH¶VLQVLJKWVWRWKHHQYLURQPHQWDO¿HOGZKLFKHYHQWXDOO\OHGWR
a more formal conception of an ETS.3 In very simple terms, an ETS 
requires a functioning market where polluting companies can trade 
the pollution licenses they were originally allotted according to their 
need. The US became an early testing ground for cap and trade, 
ZKLFKZDVXVHGWRPLQLPL]HVXOIXUGLR[LGHHPLVVLRQVDQGOHDGIXHOV
starting in the 1980s. At around the same time, several European 
countries began to implement tax-based solutions to emissions. 
 Unlike a tax, an ETS ensures optimal allocation of pollution 
allowances and a market-driven price for emissions; its effective-
ness, however, depends on the total number of licenses available on 
the market and the market conditions, something that has created 
VLJQL¿FDQWFKDOOHQJHVLQSUDFWLFH7KHWHQVLRQVEHWZHHQWD[EDVHG
purely regulatory, and market-based policies in controlling carbon 
emissions continue to exist and inform the debate on climate change 
action. While most national policies involve a mix of different ap-
proaches, cap and trade has gained increasing popularity internation-
ally since the Kyoto Protocol (1998), which among other things led 
to the establishment of the European Union ETS (EU ETS) in 2005. 
In fact, while emission markets may have originated in the United 
States, the EU became one of the strongest backers for carbon trading 
as it moved away from carbon taxes, which were found politically 
inexpedient. The EU ETS now represents the largest greenhouse 
gas (GHG) market in the world, providing, for better or worse, a 
2 Coase largely reacted to the work of British economist A.C. Pigou and those who fol-
lowed his views on taxation (Pigouvian tax). 
3 Tom Tietenberg, “Cap-and-Trade: The Evolution of an Economic Idea,” Agricultural 
and Resource Economics Review 39, no. 3 (October 2010): 359–60. 
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model for other countries. If China were to succeed in establishing a 
nation-wide ETS, the two markets would be the largest in the world. 
7KH6LJQL¿FDQFHRI&KLQD¶V(763URJUDP
China’s unprecedented economic growth since the late 1970s has 
led to extraordinary social and environmental imbalances, which the 
government has become increasingly concerned with. Air quality 
is especially problematic from a political point of view due to its 
immediate impact on urban dwellers’ living standards, placing 
LQWHQVH SUHVVXUH RQ WKH VWDWH WR¿QG VROXWLRQV&KLQD¿UVW H[SHUL-
mented with pilot ETS programs on a limited scale in the 1990s. 
7KLV ZDV WKH ¿UVW VWHS WRZDUGV LQWURGXFLQJ D PDUNHW V\VWHP WR
monitor environmental degradation and had no noticeable impact 
in the short term. It would take two decades for the country to move 
towards implementing a true carbon market. In 2011, the Chinese 
OHDGHUVKLSDQQRXQFHGLQLWVWZHOIWK¿YH\HDUSODQWKH
launch of seven pilot markets in an effort to set the foundations of a 
nation-wide scheme. Between late 2013 and early 2014, six of the 
seven Chinese ETS pilots opened to trading. 
 &KLQD¶V KLJK SUR¿OH VKLIW WRZDUG XVLQJ PDUNHWGULYHQ LQ-
struments to reduce environmental degradation and pollution has 
VLJQL¿FDQWLPSOLFDWLRQVGRPHVWLFDOO\DQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\$WKRPH
the recently established pilot carbon markets could serve as a model 
for a national ETS and help alleviate China’s air pollution and limit 
emissions. It could also drive institutional reforms in other sectors, 
VXFKDVODZDQG¿QDQFH)URPDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYHLIVXF-
cessful, the Chinese carbon dioxide (CO2) markets would incentiv-
L]HRWKHUFRXQWULHVOLNHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWRDFFHOHUDWHWKHGHYHORS-
ment of national or regional ETSs. China could also offer a model 
for other emerging economies struggling to contain high levels of 
carbon emissions and inject new life in those existing systems whose 
future depends on the prospective of an integrated global market, 
like the European Union’s. Lastly, the carbon markets could play a 
VLJQL¿FDQWUROHLQ&KLQHVHGLSORPDWLFQHJRWLDWLRQVDWWKHXSFRPLQJ
WZHQW\¿UVWVHVVLRQRIWKH&RQIHUHQFHRIWKH3DUWLHVWRWKH8QLWHG
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
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scheduled for 2015 in Paris. 
 Conversely, if the pilots are deemed a failure, the future of 
carbon markets will be at risk. Many factors, ranging from corrup-
tion to low institutional capacity and bad enforcement, could prevent 
WKHVFKHPHIURPVXFFHVVIXOO\UHGXFLQJHPLVVLRQV,QVXI¿FLHQWOLEHU-
DOL]DWLRQLQWKHHQHUJ\PDUNHWV¿QDQFHDQGODZFRXOGDOVRKLQGHU
the adoption of carbon markets. Additionally, Beijing’s strategy of 
encouraging experimentation at the local level to develop skills, 
EXLOGSROLWLFDOVXSSRUWDQG¿QGEHVWSUDFWLFHVFRXOGKDYHQHJDWLYH
repercussions insofar as it will lead to the establishment of isolated 
markets with distinct rules. 
 Given the magnitude of the challenge, looking at experiences 
abroad could help Chinese policymakers avoid pitfalls and adopt 
best practices in developing emission markets. The EU’s cap and 
trade program traded 7.903 millions of tones in 2012.4$QDO\]LQJ
the EU ETS and comparing it to the Chinese ETS pilots can provide 
DIUDPHZRUNWRLGHQWLI\FKDOOHQJHVDQGGH¿QHH[SHFWDWLRQVIRUWKH
future of emission markets globally.
 While the EU ETS encompasses thirty-one countries, its 
aggregate volume of emissions is lower than China’s, which in 
2008 accounted for 23 percent of carbon emissions worldwide (by 
comparison that same year the EU27 countries excluding Estonia, 
Lithuania and Latvia accounted for 13 percent).5 In 2008, Shanghai’s 
emissions alone were estimated to be higher than those of Italy, 
the second largest manufacturing country in Europe. By the same 
HVWLPDWHWKHPRVWLQGXVWULDOL]HGHFRQRP\LQWKH(8(76*HUPDQ\
was a smaller polluter than the city of Guangdong.6 The pilots are 
operating in geographic areas that account for approximately 42 
percent of China’s carbon emissions in 2008, which make them ag-
gregately the second-largest ETS in the world after the EU ETS.7 
4 European Commission, The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) Factsheet 
3XEOLFDWLRQV2I¿FHRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ2FWREHUKWWSHFHXURSDHXFOLPD
publications/docs/factsheet_ets_en.pdf.
5 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Global Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Data, last updated September 9, 2013, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemis-
sions/global.html.
6 Kong Bo and Carla Freeman, “Making Sense of Carbon Market Development in 
China,” Carbon & Climate Law Review 7, no. 3 (September 2013): 195.
7 Ibid.
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The latter regulates about 45 percent of EU GHG emissions and aims 
to cover 65 percent of emissions by 2020.8 Whatever the long-term 
achievements of the Chinese and EU ETSs, they represent some 
of the most ambitious experiments in reducing carbon and GHG 
emissions.
 ,ZLOO¿UVWDQDO\]HWKHKLVWRU\DQGFXUUHQWVWDWXVRIWKH(8
ETS and then provide an overview of the seven Chinese carbon 
market pilots, followed by a comparative analysis. The comparison 
will focus on the institutional dimension and the challenges that 
the Chinese pilots face due to low coordination and bureaucratic 
capacity. Finally, I will provide suggestions for cooperation.
The European Union Emissions Trading System
The EU is a supranational institution and regulatory giant that 
was slowly built through an intricate web of laws and agreements 
between sovereign nations. This means that while implementa-
tion is generally left to the individual country, there is a common 
framework negotiated at the top. The Commission, the top executive 
DJHQF\OHGE\QDWLRQDODSSRLQWHHVDFWVDVDKDUPRQL]HUE\LVVXLQJ
directives that guide domestic policies in the member states. As a 
consequence, the EU countries’ laws and policies are converging 
overall, particularly in those areas under the Commission’s jurisdic-
tion. Governments, however, still have strong incentives to favor 
their domestic businesses when it comes to handing out permits and 
LVVXLQJ¿QHVHVSHFLDOO\ZKHUHWKH\IHHOWKDWRWKHUVWDWHVDUHGRLQJ
the same. Each country has to pass proposed EU regulation through 
LWVQDWLRQDOSROLWLFDOV\VWHPDGDSWLQJLWWRLWVVSHFL¿FEXUHDXFUDWLF
structure, which leads to differences in implementation. In the case 
of common targets, the tools through which these are achieved are 
left to the individual states, meaning that very different policies 
may be adopted toward the same ends. These competing forces and 
multiple layers of bargaining are essential to understanding EU gove 
nance and the development of the EU GHG emission market.
 The EU ETS covers over 11,000 power stations and in-
GXVWULDO SODQWV DFURVV(XURSH DVZHOO DV DLUOLQHVÀ\LQJZLWKLQ WKH
8 European Commission, The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) Factsheet, 1.
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European Economic Area (EEA).9 The system was developed as a 
policy tool to facilitate compliance with the Kyoto Protocol com-
mitments undertaken by the original EU member states (EU-15). 
In aggregate, the EU-15 countries committed to reduce emissions 
by 8 percent compared to the 1990 levels by 2012.10 With the EU 
accession rounds of 2004, 2008, and 2013 the new EU member 
states were also integrated into the ETS and the low-carbon targets, 
along with Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. 
 While the EU ETS was established to help EU member states 
meet their commitments under the Kyoto protocol, it functions as one 
of four legislative instruments developed to achieve the so-called 
20-20-20 targets set by EU leaders in 2007 and enacted in 2009 
with the climate and energy package. The targets provide a common 
framework for member states to pursue low-carbon development. 
0RUHVSHFL¿FDOO\ WKH\FRQVLVW LQ UHGXFLQJ*+*HPLVVLRQVE\
percent from levels in 1990, raising the share of renewable energy 
resources consumed in the EU to 20 percent, and improving of energy 
HI¿FLHQF\E\SHUFHQWE\11 The climate and energy package 
includes national targets for reducing and monitoring emissions not 
included in the ETS, national targets for increasing renewable energy 
sources, and legislation setting the bases for developing of carbon 
capture and storage facilities.127KH(8HQHUJ\HI¿FLHQF\GLUHFWLYH
which EU member states were required to implement by June 2014 
(with some limited exceptions), was drafted separately, but is also 
considered instrumental to the achievement of the 20-20-20 goals. 
EU planning also takes into consideration the wealth and base level 
of member states, requiring countries with better environmental 
infrastructure to commit to higher targets (this is consistent with the 
approach used for the Kyoto protocol commitments).
 The EU GHG emission market has been implemented in 
WKUHHGLVWLQFWSKDVHV3KDVH,ZDVRI¿FLDOO\ODXQFKHG
the same year the Kyoto protocol entered into effect. This initial 
9 European Commission, The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) Factsheet, 1.
10 Pew Center on Global Climate Change, The European Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU-ETS) Insights and Opportunities (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2005), 
2. http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/EU-ETS%20White%20Paper.pdf.




phase served as a testing ground to help develop necessary institu-
WLRQVDQGSURYLGHDQDGMXVWPHQWSHULRGWR¿UPVDQGKXPDQFDSLWDO13 
7KHV\VWHPZDVDGRSWHGE\DOOWKHWZHQW\¿YH(8PHPEHUFRXQWULHV
at the time and covered only CO2 emissions from combusting in-
stallations.14 Permits applied to the plants themselves instead of the 
company.15 The national governments allocated most of the allow-
ances for free. 
 Member countries were entirely responsible during this 
period for permit allocation and emission monitoring. National 
governments submitted National Allocation Plans (NAP) to the 
Commission for review, describing how they intended to implement 
the ETS and meet the country’s commitments under the Kyoto 
protocol. The Commission could request changes to some of the 
plans. In practice, the few revision requests related to scenarios 
where the volume of allowances exceeded projected emissions and 
when member states planned to redistribute permits after the initial 
allocation.16 Beyond the design of the system, the Commission’s 
role was limited to ensuring that all countries followed its directives 
and developed responses to issues as they emerged. Each member 
country was responsible for identifying the right number of allow-
ances to issue and establishing proper monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms.17  
 7KH(8(763KDVH,KDVEHHQPRVWO\FULWLFL]HGIRUWKHRYHU
allocation of permits by member states despite the Commission’s 
UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV DQG VXEVHTXHQW ZLQGIDOO SUR¿WV IRU FRPSDQLHV
with excess allowances.18 /DFN RI UHOLDEOH GDWD DQG KDUPRQL]HG
practices meant that national governments were allowed to use 
various methods to distribute emission allowances, leading to their 
13 Peter Sopher and Anthony Mansell, “European Union” in The World’s Carbon 
Markets: A Case Study Guide To Emissions Trading (Washington, DC: Environmental 
Defense Fund and International Emission Trading Association, March 2014), 2.
14 Richard Mao et al., Environomist: China Carbon Market Research Report 2014 (Bei-
jing: Environomist Ltd., 2014), 11-12.
15 Ibid.
16 “National Allocation Plans,” European Commission, last updated July 9, 2014, http://
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/nap/index_en.htm.
17 Ibid. 
18 Tim Laing et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of the EU Emissions Trading System 
(Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, January 2013), 23.
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over allocation.19 To counter this trend, the Commission rules that 
licenses from the 2005-2007 period could not be used in the second 
phase.20 The Commission’s own assessment highlighted the lack of 
transparency and the time-consuming procedures involved with the 
NAP.21,WDOVRFRQFOXGHGWKDW¿UPVQHHGFOHDUVLJQDOVIURPLQVWLWX-
tions in order to adjust production accordingly before new rules are 
put into place.22  
 Phase I of the EU ETS was always designed to be a trial 
WHVW WR LGHQWLI\ÀDZV DQGGHYHORS LQVWLWXWLRQDO FRPSHWHQFLHV7KH
Commission expected Phase II (2008-2012) to correct issues that 
emerged in previous years in order to target emissions more effec-
tively. The changes in the ETS Directive—the legal basis for the 
cap and trade program—strengthened the system by streamlining 
procedures, improving transparency, and reducing the number of 
allowances.237KHJOREDO¿QDQFLDOFULVLVKRZHYHUFUHDWHGVHYHUDO
unforeseen challenges for policymakers. First of all, the recession 
dampened some governments’ commitment to implement a program 
WKDWPLJKWSODFHDEXUGHQRQSURGXFHUVDQGVLJQL¿FDQWH[HPSWLRQV
were introduced to aid struggling industries throughout Europe. 
Even more importantly, as economic activity slowed down so did 
emissions. The fall in emissions not only lowered the market price 
IRU FDUERQ LWPDGH LW VLJQL¿FDQWO\ KDUGHU WR DVVHVV WKH HIIHFWLYH-
ness of the program.24 While the Commission reduced the volume 
of allowances by 6.5 percent compared to 2005, the demand fell 
even faster; the result was that many installations held on to unused 
permits, suppressing the market price.25 Part of the problem was 
that projected emissions were based on reported emissions from the 
19/XFDV0HUULOO%URZQ$OH[+DQD¿DQG$QQLH3HWVRQNThe EU Emissions Trading 
System: Results and Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: Environmental Defense Fund, 
2012), iiv. http://www.edf.org/climate/eu-emissions-trading-system-report.
20 “EU ETS 2005-2012,” The European Commission, last updated July 9, 2014, http://
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/index_en.htm.
21 “National Allocation Plans.”
22 Ibid.
23 Peter Zapfel and Vicky Pollard, “The EU ETS: A Review of the Back-Loading De-
bate,” in Emissions Trading Worldwide ICAP Status Report 2014HGV&RQVWDQ]H+DXJ
et al. (International Carbon Action Partnership, 2014), 8. https://icapcarbonaction.com/
news-archive/209-emissions-trading-worldwide-icap-status-report-2014.




previous periods, meaning that the early over allocation by national 
government persisted into the second phase as well.
 The most visible changes during Phase II were the expansion 
to twenty-seven countries (to include the new EU members Bulgaria 
and Romania) and the inclusion of nitrous oxide (N2O) in the 
system. The Commission also established a series of directives to 
VWDQGDUGL]H WKH1$3 DQG SURYLGHPRUH LQIRUPDWLRQ WR WKH SXEOLF
to promote transparency. To this end, in 2012, it launched a public 
European Union Transaction Log (EUTL), an online database that 
collects all information on permits and installations participating 
in the ETS. The EUTL replaced the national registries to ensure 
FRQVLVWHQF\SUHYHQWGRXEOHDFFRXQWLQJDQGIUDXGDQGV\VWHPDWL]H
permit registration across countries.26 This was also a preliminary 
step in shifting permit issuance from the individual member states 
to the Commission.
 $IWHU  ¿QHVZHUH UDLVHG IURP IRUW\ HXURV SHU WRQ RI
carbon to one hundred euros per ton.27 Single member states 
UHPDLQHG UHVSRQVLEOH IRU PRQLWRULQJ UHSRUWLQJ DQG YHUL¿FDWLRQ
(MRV). Given the EU bureaucratic structure, the Commission 
cannot directly enforce regulation in the member countries nor can 
it carry out large-scale MRV activities directly. Since the different 
member countries have very different budgets and environmental 
SROLFLHV WKH &RPPLVVLRQ IRXQG LW VLJQL¿FDQWO\PRUH FKDOOHQJLQJ
than anticipated in early feasibility studies to ensure a homogeneous 
level of compliance with its directives on the ETS across countries.28 
 The EU ETS entered Phase III in 2013 and is planned to last 
through 2020. The new system includes a set of more stringent rules, 
including the shift from national to EU-level permit approval.29 The 
Commission is now directly responsible for auctioning and allocat-
ing permits and the NAP has been discontinued. This allows the 
Commission to reduce the number of allowances and to coordinate 
the inclusion of new sectors into the scheme. Among those permits 
26 “Union Registry,” European Commission, last updated July 9, 2014, http://ec.europa.
eu/clima/policies/ets/registry/index_en.htm.
27 Mao et al., Environomist, 11.
28 Braden Smith, “Transnational Carbon-Trading Standards: Improving the Transpar-
ency and Coordination of Post-Kyoto Carbon Trading Markets,” Pace Environmental 
Law Review 30, no. 1 (Fall 2012): 368.
29 Mao et al., Environomist, 12.
 60
that are being approved, more are being auctioned rather than 
allocated in a gradual move toward a fully market-driven system.
 With regard to MRV, the Commission continues to play an 
LPSRUWDQWUROHLQKDUPRQL]DWLRQDQGRYHUVHHVWKHVRFDOOHGFRPSOL-
ance cycle. Operators are required to self-report using electronic 
WHPSODWHVDQGDUHYHUL¿HGE\DQDFFUHGLWHGWKLUGSDUW\E\0DUFK
every year; they must then submit the appropriate number of allow-
ances by the following April 30.30  
 Overall, the system relies heavily on the presence of a central 
regulator that can ensure common standards, consistency over 
time, and credibility. This is especially the case when differences 
in national policies, budget allocations, and laws create regional 
discrepancies. As a consequence the Commission is becoming in-
creasingly important, and its role is crucial in a market that is still 
developing. In addition to monitoring pricing, the standards it sets 
KHOSEROVWHURSHUDWRUV¶FRQ¿GHQFHE\HQVXULQJORZFRUUXSWLRQDQG
FUHGLEOHDFFUHGLWDWLRQ IRU WKLUGSDUW\YHUL¿HUV2Q WKHRWKHUKDQG
the lack of credible institutions has created some controversy in the 
approval of offsetting investments, or the credits earned by GHG 
emitters through the funding of projects in developing countries, 
particularly in the case of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). 
 Whatever its effectiveness in offsetting global GHG 
emissions, the CDM has been one of the main channels through 
ZKLFK WKH (8 KDV LQÀXHQFHG &KLQD¶V HPLVVLRQ UHGXFWLRQ VWUDWH-
gies. The CDM as established in the Kyoto protocol is aimed at 
promoting emission-reduction investments in developing countries. 
It was hoped that this mechanism would reduce overall emissions 
while introducing low-carbon technology and market-driven tools 
for environmental management in lower income countries.31 There 
has also increasing scrutiny of these projects due to what has become 
known as the question of “additionality.” This refers to a foreign 
company funding projects abroad to offset its domestic emissions 
30³0RQLWRULQJ5HSRUWLQJDQG9HUL¿FDWLRQRI(8(76(PLVVLRQV´European Com-
mission, last updated July 9, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/monitoring/
index_en.htm.
31/XFDV0HUULOO%URZQ$OH[+DQD¿DQG$QQLH3HWVRQNThe EU Emissions Trading 
System: Results and Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: Environmental Defense Fund, 
2012), 23. http://www.edf.org/climate/eu-emissions-trading-system-report.
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that would have been carried out built regardless—undermining the 
very idea of a carbon emission-offsetting project. For example, the 
government of a given country may have already scheduled to build 
a renewable energy power plant, but by making it appear as though 
this project was designed for the CDM it can obtain external funding 
in this way. The problem with this is that if the CDM recipient country 
would have carried out the project anyway then the mechanism is 
QRWEULQJLQJDQ\EHQH¿W²DQG(8FRPSDQLHVDUHQRWWUXO\RIIVHWWLQJ
their emissions, and there is no additional emission reduction taking 
place. Until 2013 China was the largest recipient of CDM projects, 
and the country where the issue of additionality was allegedly most 
common. As a consequence the EU in 2011 announced that starting 
in 2013 it would accept only offsets from projects carried out in least 
developed countries, making BRIC countries like China ineligible.32 
 7KH(XURSHDQ¿UPVIXQGLQJWKH&'0SURMHFWVHVWDEOLVKHG
a market and local stakeholders with strong interests. The latter 
have become players in the Chinese ETS debate as they hoped to 
receive domestic funds to replace the European ones to fund their 
renewable projects after the latter are phased out.33 It is no secret that 
the Commission hopes to link the EU ETS to other carbon markets 
to ensure the long-term sustainability of the project and make the 
program more effective.34 An agreement was made with Australia 
to link its ETS with the European one by 2015, but the new gov-
ernment in Canberra repealed the legislation for carbon pricing, 
effectively dismantling its carbon markets, in July of this year.35 The 
EU Climate Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard was quick to 
express regret and clarify that the dialogue over linking the EU ETS 
32 Bo and Freeman, “Making Sense of Carbon Market Development in China,” 198.
33 Ibid. 
34 “International Carbon Market,” European Commission, accessed March 21, 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/index_en.htm. 
35 Michelle Innis, Stanley Reed, and Coral Davenport, “Australia Tax Repeal Is Big 
Blow to Fight Against Emissions,” The New York Times, July 17, 2014, http://www.ny-
WLPHVFRPEXVLQHVVLQWHUQDWLRQDODXVWUDOLDWD[UHSHDOLVELJEORZWR¿JKW
against-emissions.html; Lenore Taylor, “Australia Kills off Carbon Tax,” The Guardian, 
July 17, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/17/australia-kills-off-
carbon-tax.
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to Australia’s would be discontinued.36 Thus, China, a new player in 
WKLV¿HOGPD\KDYHDOUHDG\EHFRPHRQHRIWKH(8(76¶EHVWKRSHV
for the future. 
China’s Emission Trading System
6LQFH  VL[ SLORW PDUNHWV VWDUWHG RSHUDWLQJ LQ *XDQJ]KRX
%HLMLQJ6KDQJKDL+XEHL7LDQMLQDQG6KHQ]KHQ&KRQJTLQJZDVWKH
ODVWPDUNHWWRVWDUWWUDGLQJLQ-XO\ZKLOHWKHFLW\RI+DQJ]KRX
is also in the process of developing its own market.37 The current 
Director General of Climate Change at the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC), Su Wei, recently declared that 
emissions from heavy polluters such as Hebei, as well as Inner 
Mongolia and Shanxi, could be regulated through a carbon market 
in the near future, signaling the powerful agency’s commitment to 
a nation-wide scheme.38 There are already agreements among other 
administrative units that are considering developing their own ETS, 
LQFOXGLQJ+DQJ]KRXDQG6X]KRX+HEHL ,QQHU0RQJROLD6KDQ[L
and Shandong signed an agreement for future cooperation with 
Beijing in developing their ETS.39 These trends point to a strategy 
of gradual expansion of individual systems rather than creating a 
top-down regulatory framework like the European one.40 
 The Chinese government’s decision to launch several pilots 
DWWKHVDPHWLPHLQUHÀHFWVWKH1'5&¶VDJJUHVVLYHSXVKWR¿QG
more effective, market-driven systems to manage pollution control, 
coupled with a well-established approach of testing policies at the 
36 “Connie Hedegaard: ‘The EU Regrets the Repeal of Australia’s Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism’,” European Commission, July 17, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/commis-
sion_2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines/news/2014-07-17_01_en.htm.
37 “International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP),” International Carbon Action Part-
nership, accessed May 2, 2014, https://icapcarbonaction.com.
38 Kathy Chen and Stian Reklev, “China Says Could Add Big-Polluting Regions to 
Carbon Market,” Reuters, May 1, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/01/us-
china-carbon-idUSKBN0DG0AG20140501.
39 “Beijing Starts China’s Third Carbon Exchange With First Trades,” Bloomberg, 
November 29, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-29/beijing-starts-china-
VWKLUGFDUERQH[FKDQJHZLWK¿UVWWUDGHVKWPO
40 While it is true that Denmark and the UK already had voluntary markets in place, 
which did provide some inspiration for the EU ETS, they were not established through a 
EU-wide effort and did not have as large of an impact as the phase I in the development 
of institutions beyond those individual countries. 
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local level before implementing them at the national level.41 China 
has been remarkably successful in creating regulatory frameworks ex 
IDFWROHJLWLPL]LQJSUDFWLFHVWKDWHPHUJHGDWWKHORFDOOHYHOXVXDOO\
in response to broad directives at the central level). This is meant 
to mitigate political risk tied to establishing a nation-wide system, 
identify a successful model, and rectify problems on a smaller scale. 
 There are however some risks tied to the ground-up policy: a 
successful ETS requires a sophisticated bureaucratic apparatus and 
technology to guarantee market mechanisms, as well as administra-
tive capacity to carry out MRV activities and enforce punishments 
and compliance. It is unclear if local governments can muster the 
resources needed for this kind of project. In the case of the EU, the 
Commission’s directives function within a highly regulated legal 
IUDPHZRUNDLPHGDWVWDQGDUGL]LQJQDWLRQDOSROLFLHV ,Q&KLQD WKH
1'5&ZLOODOVREHLPSRUWDQWDVDKDUPRQL]LQJIRUFHLQZKDWUHPDLQV
a very fragmented system, ranging from the highly regulated and 
VSOLQWHUHGHQHUJ\DQG¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWV WRGHFHQWUDOL]HGGHFLVLRQ
making by local governments. Allowing each pilot to experiment 
with very different rules will undoubtedly create problems in 
creating a single market. While the UK and Denmark already had 
voluntary ETS, which provided models for the EU ETS, the union-
wide market itself was developed separately. It remains to be seen 
LIWKHEHQH¿WVRISURPRWLQJFUHDWLYLW\DQGWHVWLQJZLOORXWZHLJKWKH
problems in coordination that will emerge. A plan for a countrywide 
(76LV OLNHO\ WREHDQQRXQFHG LQ WKHQH[W¿YH\HDUSODQ LQ
DQG1'5&RI¿FLDOVKDYHPDGHSXEOLFVWDWHPHQWVVHWWLQJDVWKH
launch date for a national ETS.42 
 It is still early to assess the successes and failures of the indi-
vidual schemes, which are still in an experimental phase. All of the 
pilots’ initial trading periods, however, are scheduled to end in 2015, 
ZKLFKPHDQVWKDWSROLF\PDNHUVDUHDOUHDG\DQDO\]LQJDFKLHYHPHQWV
and failures.43 The main traits of the programs already reveal some of 
41 Bo and Freeman, “Making Sense of Carbon Market Development in China,” 196-197. 
42 Gerard Wynn, “China Expects to Launch National Carbon Market in 2018-Govt Of-
¿FLDO´RTCC, May 30, 2014, http://www.rtcc.org/2014/05/30/china-expects-to-launch-
national-carbon-market-in-2018/.
43 “Diving into the Details: Planned and Operating Emissions Trading Schemes Around 
the World,” in Emissions Trading Worldwide ICAP Status Report 2014HGV&RQVWDQ]H
Haug et al. (International Carbon Action Partnership, 2014), 47-53.
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the issues that might emerge in the future. All pilots report emissions 
and comply with monitoring yearly, although allowances are issued 
annually in some systems and for the entire period in others.44 So 
far CO2 is the only emission traded on any of the markets although 
JRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVKDYHLQGLFDWHGWKDWVLPLODUO\WRWKH(8(76
more types of emissions may be included in the future. 
 All pilot markets in force at the time of writing monitor 
HPLVVLRQVE\¿UPWKLVLVGLIIHUHQWIURPWKH(8(76ZKLFKWDUJHWV
single installations.45 Because all Chinese pilots require compliance 
IURP ¿UPV WKDW HPLW DERYH D FHUWDLQ WKUHVKROG FRPSDQLHV FRXOG
potentially evade restrictions by breaking up into smaller legal 
entities. This would create an even larger number of polluters that 
FDQHYDGHFRQWUROVPRUHHDVLO\GXHWRWKHLUVL]H2QWKHRWKHUKDQG
¿UPOHYHO PRQLWRULQJ UHGXFHV WKH EXUGHQ RQ ORFDO JRYHUQPHQWV
whose resources dedicated to the ETS MRV are likely to be spread 
thin already. This practical consideration may have played a role in 
WKHGHFLVLRQWRRSWIRU¿UPOHYHOPRQLWRULQJ
 The ETS pilots vary in terms of the industries and sectors 
covered. For example, Shanghai’s ETS includes airlines and key 
service industries, Beijing and Tianjin require compliance from 
ODUJHSXEOLFEXLOGLQJV DQG*XDQJGRQJDQG6KHQ]KHQDUH FRQVLG-
ering incorporating the transportation sectors.46 This diversity in 
requirements may facilitate in the long run the extension of the ETS 
to a wider variety of players, something that the EU cap and trade 
program has struggled with—as proved by the controversies sur-
URXQGLQJWKHH[SDQVLRQWRLQFOXGHÀLJKWHPLVVLRQV47  This remains 
speculative, as it is still unclear what a nation-wide ETS would look 
like in China. 
 The expansion of the ETS to include a broader number of 
polluters is likely to take place at the local level before we even see 
a national scheme. Already, all ETS pilots require a broad number of 
44 Ibid.
45 Mao et al., Environomist, 49.
46 “Diving into the Details: Planned and Operating Emissions Trading Schemes Around 
the World,” 47-53. 
47Smith, “Transnational Carbon-Trading Standards,” 334; Susanna Twidale and 
Barbara Lewis, “EU Compromise on Airline Emissions Faces Opposition,” Reuters, 





to gradually expand the ETS to those sectors that are currently only 
being monitored.49 In all cases, an expansion in the next couple of 
years would represent an ambitious goal; challenges include highly 
regulated markets that prevent energy companies from passing costs 
to consumers, low local government capacity to enforce compliance, 
and the trading of allowances between different markets that have 
QRQKDUPRQL]HGVWDQGDUGV50 
 The Development and Reform Commissions (DRCs), the 
local branches of the NDRC, are the main institutions responsible 
for developing and implementing the ETS pilots. This ensures some 
level of coordination through the NDRC and the State Council. 
Even if the NDRC is not imposing standards at this time, it will be 
more able to do so by acting through the DRC rather than other, less 
powerful, local agencies. 
 The involvement of other actors in the design of the ETS, 
including universities, research centers, and exchange platforms 
could also produce a positive spillover effect in terms of developing 
human capital and institution building. This will be very important to 
establish a nation-wide system, especially given the need to strength-
en overall technical capacity, MRV, and enforcement mechanisms. 
Some international institutions like the Asian Development Bank 
and the World Bank (through its Partnership for Market Readiness 
LQLWLDWLYHKDYHDOUHDG\SURYLGHG¿QDQFLDODQGWHFKQLFDOVXSSRUWIRU
the development of the ETS pilots and other low-carbon projects.51 
The EU-China Partnership on Climate Change, established in 2005, 
provides a framework for collaboration between the two regions 
and EU institutions have already been cooperating with China on 
48Mao et al., Environomist, 6.
49&KLQD(PLVVLRQV([FKDQJH³&KLQD¶V)LUVW(76$%ULHI,QWURGXFWLRQWRWKH6KHQ]KHQ
Carbon Market,” in Emissions Trading Worldwide ICAP Status Report 2014, eds. Con-
VWDQ]H+DXJHWDO,QWHUQDWLRQDO&DUERQ$FWLRQ3DUWQHUVKLSKWWSVLFDSFDU-
bonaction.com/news-archive/209-emissions-trading-worldwide-icap-status-report-2014.
50 Bo and Freeman, “Making Sense of Carbon Market Development in China,” 196-197.
51 More information on the projects funded by the Asian Development Bank and the 
:RUOG%DQNDUHDYDLODEOHRQWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ZHEVLWHV³$GYDQFLQJ6KDQJKDL&DUERQ
Market through Emissions Trading Scheme,” Asian Development Bank, 2012, http://
www.adb.org/projects/46054-001/details; “China,” Partnership for Market Readiness, 
2013, https://www.thepmr.org/country/china-0.
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developing more sustainable paths to urban development, par-
ticularly for the low-carbon city project in Tianjin.52 Recent reports 
indicate that cooperation on GHG market development may soon 





cymakers implementing the pilots without qualitative and quantita-
tive data, it is possible to assess them on the basis of the fundamental 
requirements for any ETS. For a carbon emission market to function 
there is a need for an emission cap, permits (allowances), a market 
platform for the trading of permits, enforcement, and monitoring 
mechanisms.54 Without effective enforcement and monitoring, 
permits will loose value. Similarly, if there is no way to effectively 
trade the allowances, then the whole system is bound to fail. Finally, 
a cap is necessary to achieve an actual reduction of emissions. 
Overall, the experience of the EU ETS suggests that strong institu-
WLRQVZLWKVLJQL¿FDQWFHQWUDOFRRUGLQDWLRQDUHLPSRUWDQWLQHVWDEOLVK-
ing a cap and trade system that is sustainable in the medium-term. 
*LYHQWKHFXUUHQWOHYHORIGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQLWZLOOEHLQWHUHVWLQJWR
see whether linking independent local schemes—the current trend 
in China—will lead to the development of an effective national cap. 
+DUG&DS
The advances made in developing institutions by the NDRC and 
52 “Joint EU-China Climate Statement: Chief Executive of EU Climate Initiative Re-
sponds,” Climate-Kic, April 2, 2014, http://www.climate-kic.org/press-releases/joint-eu-
china-climate-statement-chief-executive-of-eu-climate-initiative-responds/.
53 “US Consultancy ICF Wins Bid to Help Plan China Carbon Market,” Reuters, 
January 30, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/30/china-carbon-idUSL3N-
0L412J20140130; “ICF International Wins €5 Million European Commission Contract 
to Support Development of Emissions Trading Systems in China,” ICF International, 
-DQXDU\KWWSZZZLF¿FRPQHZVLFIZLQVHXURSHDQFRPPLVVLRQ
contract.
54 Bo and Freeman, “Making Sense of Carbon Market Development in China,” 200-202.
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the local DRCs over the past three years are remarkable, especially 
LQGHYHORSLQJPHFKDQLVPV IRUPRQLWRULQJDQGHQIRUFLQJ¿QHV IRU
QRQFRPSOLDQW¿UPV+RZHYHUWKHUHLVVWLOOPXFKPRUHWREHGRQH55 
For example, at the moment only one pilot—Chongqing’s—has 
established a hard cap (for the year 2013 it was set at 125 Mt CO2; 
annual reduction factor: 4.13%), and since the program only started 
in June 2014 it is too early to assess its effectiveness.56 Other pilots 
are opting instead for carbon emissions per GDP reduction targets.57 
In recent statements, He Jiankun, chairman of China’s Advisory 
Committee on Climate Change, announced that a hard cap on carbon 
HPLVVLRQVZRXOG EH DQQRXQFHG LQ WKH QH[W ¿YH\HDU SODQ 
2020).58 However, the modalities through which the cap would be 
implemented—for example if this would be announced along with 
a national system or for individual markets—have so far not been 
addressed.
 The EU adopted a hard cap approach for its ETS from 
the beginning, even though during Phase I national governments 
allocated enough allowances to make the cap effectively null. 
Similarly, overestimating emissions for the 2008-2012 period also 
led to low carbon permit prices and to some plants holding excess al-
ORZDQFHV7KHUXOHVZHUHKRZHYHUDOUHDG\LQSODFHDQG¿UPVZHUH




of EU ETS permit auctioning and approval, now handled directly by 
the Commission, there has been a renewed push to control emissions 
through permit scarcity. 
0RQLWRULQJDQG(QIRUFHPHQW
Monitoring and information are also important factors to the success 
55 Ibid., 196.
56 “Chongqing Pilot System,” International Carbon Action Partnership, accessed July 
22, 2014, https://icapcarbonaction.com.
57 Mao et al., Environomist, 10-28.
58 Kathy Chen and Stian Reklev, “China Plans Absolute CO2 Cap from 2016,” Re-
uters, March 6, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/03/china-climatechange-
idUKT9N0NH02W20140603.
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of an ETS; the Chinese government has a poor track record when it 
comes to enforcing environmental regulation, especially at the local 
level. If the ETS permits were revealed to be worthless due to the 
lack of effective monitoring and enforcing this would have serious 
repercussions on the credibility of the system as well as its effective-
ness. This is already one of the major challenges in international 
trading, especially for middle income and developing countries; it 
has also been an issue for CDM projects.59  
 In the EU, credibility of the system depends on strict guide-
lines on how member states implement monitoring and reporting 
UHJXODWLRQDQGWKLUGSDUW\DFFUHGLWDWLRQDQGYHUL¿FDWLRQ(PLVVLRQV
must be reported using the standard templates available on the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V ZHEVLWH WKH UHSRUW WKHQ KDV WR EH YHUL¿HG E\ DF-
credited third party agencies that comply with the guidelines and 
ISO standards.60 Reports must be made available to the public to 
ensure transparency and promote oversight from civil society. Key 
to the success of the system is the credibility of the accreditation 
V\VWHPRIWKHWKLUGSDUW\YHUL¿HUVZKRHQVXUHWKDW¿UPVDUHXSWR
WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V VWDQGDUGV7KH UHOLDQFHRQH[WHUQDOYHUL¿FDWLRQ
also allows the Commission to collect information without over-
extending its capacity. Without such mechanisms or the capacity 
to collect data on emissions and compliance, policymakers have a 
limited ability to assess the effectiveness of the program and the 
need to adjust permit prices.
 The challenges the EU ETS faces in coordinating national 
allowance allocation and reporting are a poignant reminder that a 
system is only as effective as its implementation. Chinese policy-
makers are already wary of the danger posed by pressure on local 
JRYHUQPHQWV WR SURWHFW GRPHVWLF LQGXVWU\ 7KH FR]\ UHODWLRQVKLS
between the business sector and local governments, especially in the 
case of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), has been a big obstacle to 
enforcing environmental protection regulation in China in general. 
It would not be unthinkable for local governments to overestimate 
HPLVVLRQVDQGVXSSUHVVWKHSULFHRIFDUERQLQWKHVKRUWWHUPWREHQH¿W
local SOEs, following the EU pattern. The best solution is to ensure 
access to reliable information regarding emissions at the local level 
59 Smith, “Transnational Carbon-Trading Standards,” 329-335.
60³0RQLWRULQJ5HSRUWLQJDQG9HUL¿FDWLRQRI(8(76(PLVVLRQV´
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to the authorities managing the ETS so that they can act upon it to 
adjust the number of permits and monitor emissions. In addition to 
ensuring effective monitoring, policymakers will have to consider 
HVWDEOLVKLQJDXQL¿HGUHJLVWHUDVWKH\H[SORUHWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIOLQNV
with other markets.
 In creating a fully integrated national carbon market, the 
1'5&ZLOO DOVR KDYH WR KDUPRQL]H HQIRUFHPHQW DQGPRQLWRULQJ
SUDFWLFHVDQGHQVXUHWKDWDVWURQJFHUWL¿FDWLRQV\VWHPIRUWKLUGSDUW\
YHUL¿HUVLVSXWLQWRSODFH$OOWKHSLORWVDOORZEHWZHHQSHUFHQWWR
10 percent or less of emissions to be offset through domestic carbon 
UHGXFWLRQ SURMHFWV FHUWL¿HG WKURXJK WKH &KLQD &HUWL¿HG (PLVVLRQ
Reduction (CCER), which is the modeled after the CDM. There will 
be a need to ensure high national standards in the CCER projects as 
well to boost the credibility of the program. 
)LQDQFLDODQG/HJDO6\VWHP
A whole other set of problems arises when looking at the under-
GHYHORSHG¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWV LQ&KLQD:KLOH WKH(8LVFRPSRVHG
of sovereign countries and has no real central executive power, 
LWV¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWV DUHERWK VRSKLVWLFDWHG DQGKLJKO\ LQWHJUDWHG
3URSHUW\ULJKWVDUHDOVRZHOOSURWHFWHGDQGLQYHVWRUVDQG¿UPVKDYH
access to a broad array of credible legal instruments. China’s highly 
controlled capital markets and still-transitioning legal system thus 
could pose an obstacle in establishing a resilient carbon permit 
exchange.612SHQLQJWKH¿QDQFLDOV\VWHPDQGHQFRXUDJLQJ¿QDQFLDO
innovation as announced during the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth 
Central Committee in November 2013 will be key to the success of 
emission trading.62  
 $Q\FKDQJHVWRWKH¿QDQFLDODQGOHJDOV\VWHPZRXOGKDYHWR
be centrally mandated, with the possible exception of the Shanghai 
Free Trade Zone (FTZ). This creates a problem for local govern-
ments that do not have the power to make this kind of reform on a 
61 Bo and Freeman, “Making Sense of Carbon Market Development in China,” 202.
62 “CCP Central Committee Resolution Concerning Some Major Issues in Compre-
hensively Deepening Reform,” China Copyright and Media, trans. Rogier Creem-




local level. Similarly, the central government would have to remove 
price caps to achieve deregulation in the energy market. This will 
be crucial for the success of those ETS pilots that include emissions 
from heating and electricity (for example, Beijing and Shanghai). If 
XWLOLW\FRPSDQLHVDUHWRDFKLHYHKLJKHUHI¿FLHQF\LQWKHORQJWHUP
they will need to be able to pass some of the rising costs posed by 
the cap and trade program to consumers.63   
 :LWKRXWDQDWLRQZLGH(76SROOXWLQJ¿UPVPD\¿QGLWOHVV
costly to move to less populated and regulated areas in the western 
part of the country rather than invest in research and development 
to reduce emissions. Policies such as subsidies and tax-breaks that 
encourage companies to relocate to western provinces to promote 
economic growth in the less developed areas of the country have 
already been in place for over a decade. There is growing evidence 
that the government is now pursuing such policies with the further 
objective of reducing environmental pressure on the densely 
populated eastern cities, for example by establishing large coal 
bases in northwestern China that include coal mines, power plants 
and chemical plants.64 Moving polluting industries away from 
urban centers would do nothing to reduce overall emissions or to 
LPSURYHHI¿FLHQF\EXWLWPLJKWVOLJKWO\LPSURYHDLUTXDOLW\LQWKH
short term for some cities. The lack of public plans for emissions 
trading schemes in western, poorer regions of the country could thus 
indicate a lack of commitment to cutting GHG emissions.
The Way Forward
One of main differences in the development of carbon markets in 
China and the EU observed so far has been the top-down approach 
of the latter versus the ground-up method of the former. While dif-
ferences in the two political systems and institutional experience 
63 Bo and Freeman, “Making Sense of Carbon Market Development in China,” 202.
64 “China Outsourcing Smog to West Region Stirs Protest,” Bloomberg News, March 7, 
2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-06/china-outsourcing-smog-to-west-
region-stirs-protest.html; Richard Martin, “The Great Coal Migration,” Fortune 170, no. 
1 (July 21, 2014): 14–16; Edward Wong, “China’s Energy Plans Will Worsen Climate 




in conducting reform and consolidating power explain the relative 
DGYDQWDJHVWRDGHFHQWUDOL]HGDSSURDFKIRUFUHDWLQJ(76VLQ&KLQD
WKHUHDUHVLJQL¿FDQWULVNVDVZHOO,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHFKDOOHQJHVSRVHG
E\PDUNHW UHIRUPEXGJHWVPRQLWRULQJ FDSDFLW\ DQG VWDQGDUGL]D-
tion, there is also the question of what role the ETS will play in the 
broader environmental protection strategy. 
 Without a broader environmental policy framework, an 
ETS can only achieve limited results. The EU system is part of a 
VHW RI WRROV DLPHG DW SODFLQJ LQFHQWLYHV IRU¿UPV DQGKRXVHKROGV
WR UHGXFH FDUERQ FRQVXPSWLRQ DQG LPSURYH HI¿FLHQF\ (YHQ VR
there is an ongoing debate over the actual impact that the ETS has 
had on curbing emissions. A 2013 working paper published by 
the UK-based Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy 
and The Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment Several surveyed several studies and found that most 
agreed that the reduction in total capped emission due to the ETS (as 
opposed to other policies and the economic crisis) has been between 
2 and 3 percent, or about 40–80 MtCO2.65 Can China do better? 
 Enforcement mechanisms and technical expertise do not 
emerge from a vacuum. While Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai have 
run voluntary trade exchanges since 2008, there is still an institutional 
DQGKXPDQFDSLWDOJDSWREH¿OOHG66 The National People’s Congress 
adopted a new environmental protection law last April that offers 
a legal framework for pursuing more aggressive environmental 
policies and seems to demonstrate renewed commitment to ensuring 
energy independence.67 There may still be, however, a learning 
curve facing China’s policymakers and enforcement agencies, 
which will need a larger staff and budget as well as enhanced legal 
instruments. Incentive structures will also have to be put in place, 
IRU H[DPSOHE\PDNLQJRI¿FLDOV DFFRXQWDEOH IRU WKH SHUIRUPDQFH
of the ETS, which could provide a tangible, measureable standard 
to ensure local governments’ commitment. The central government 
KDVXVHGWKHFDGUHHYDOXDWLRQV\VWHPWRSULRULWL]HSROLFLHVSURPRWLQJ
65 Laing et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of the EU Emissions Trading System, 25.
66 Peter Sopher and Anthony Mansell, “China,” in The World’s Carbon Markets: A Case 
Study Guide to Emissions Trading (Washington, DC: Environmental Defense Fund and 
International Emission Trading Association, March 2014).
67 “China’s Legislature Adopts Revised Environmental Protection Law,” Xinhua, April 
24, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/24/c_133287570.htm.
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GDP growth at the local level for decades. The top leadership has 
already signaled that it intends to reform it to include environmen-
tal targets as well. This will be important also because the DRCs 
rather than Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) that answer 
to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), are managing 
the pilots,. The DRCs are generally considered more powerful than 
the EPBs and are more likely to have the resources and leverage to 
overcome the gaps in enforcement however they are responsible for 
economic development as well as the ETS. 
 The Chinese leadership appears to be invested in establish-
ing an effective national ETS; this does not mean that all the ETS 
pilots must be successful. The European experience suggests that an 
initial pilot period is likely to be more useful in identifying design 
ÀDZVDQGEXLOGLQJSROLWLFDODQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOVXSSRUWWKDQUHGXFLQJ
emissions per se. Continued central government involvement, 
however, is important to ensure the emergence of a functioning 
ETS, leading to an actual reduction in emissions. 
 7KH (8 KDV DOUHDG\ SURYLGHG VLJQL¿FDQW WHFKQLFDO DQG
¿QDQFLDO VXSSRUW WR &KLQD¶V HQYLURQPHQWDO SURJUDPV ,W VKRXOG
continue to do so, but with an eye to developing better relations 
between China, the EU, and its member states. An ETS would be 
DSRZHUIXOZD\WRPRELOL]H&KLQD¶VJUHHQLQYHVWPHQWFDSDELOLW\²
something that could have a massive impact globally. Given the EU 
DQGVHYHUDORI LWVPHPEHUVWDWHV¶H[SHUWLVH LQ WKLV¿HOG WKHUH LVD
JUHDW SRWHQWLDO IRU PXWXDOO\ EHQH¿FLDO FROODERUDWLRQ 'HYHORSLQJ
common standards for future trading and third party monitor-
ing could be a possible joint research topic for the DRCs and the 
Commission. It could also provide a basis for dialogue ahead of the 
UNFCCC Paris conference next year, especially given the history of 
mistrust between European countries and China in climate change 
diplomacy over the past few years. Similarly, building on the ex-
perience with previous CDM projects, private investors could be 
encouraged to work with the Chinese local governments to develop 
new environmentally friendly infrastructure. 
 In conclusion, the future of the Chinese ETS pilots remains 
KDUG WR UHDG 7KH VFKHPHV DUH VWLOO LQ ZKDW FDQ EH GH¿QHG DV D
“learning-by-doing” phase, comparable to the EU ETS’s Phase I. To 
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avoid some of the pitfalls experienced by the EU system, Chinese 
SROLF\PDNHUVZLOOKDYHWRHQVXUHWKDWJRRGPRQLWRULQJDQGYHUL¿FD-
tion systems are in place. These may hinge on the credibility of third 
party accreditation. More central coordination and comprehensive 
¿QDQFLDO OHJDO DQG SULFLQJ UHIRUP ZLOO DOVR EH QHHGHG DW VRPH
point in order for the schemes to succeed. It is likely that in this 
process, pressure on the central leadership to demonstrate progress 
on air pollution and climate change will be crucial. It will be the 
central leadership’s responsibility to ensure that economic, legal and 
administrative reforms continue to support efforts at the local and 
national level to establish successful carbon markets throughout the 
country.
